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ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that Fisher v. Texas does not spell doom for race-
conscious admissions policies, in spite of its call for universities to seriously 
examine whether race-neutral alternatives can attain the educational benefits of 
diversity.  The Article analyzes the internal tension in the Supreme Court’s 
doctrine on race-conscious admissions: on the one hand, the Court has called 
for universities to seriously consider race-neutral alternatives, but on the other 
hand, it has defined the educational benefits of diversity very broadly and 
granted deference to universities in defining their educational missions.  Unlike 
constitutionally-approved remedial rationales for affirmative action, the 
diversity interest has no logical endpoint or ceiling: diversity will continue to be 
important for the foreseeable future, and there is no intuitive upper limit to its 
benefits.  Moreover, the educational benefits of diversity explicitly noted in Fisher 
and Grutter v. Bollinger, such as lessening of racial stereotypes and mitigating 
feelings of isolation among minority students, require direct attention to race. 
Additionally, this Article contends that the Court’s narrow tailoring 
principles for race-conscious policies relate directly to the diversity interest: the 
holistic admissions process upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger facilitates 
individualized review and nuanced consideration of race, which help to lessen 
racial stereotypes and which cannot be replaced adequately by race-neutral 
alternatives.  Further, this Article illustrates that a holistic admissions process 
with individualized review cannot be entirely race-neutral, and that universities 
already place a de facto limit on their use of race in admissions, through their 
own academic selectivity.  As a result, this Article contends that universities 
have not reached their desired level of racial diversity and related educational 
benefits, and the Supreme Court’s call to curb race-conscious policies runs 
counter to its own articulation of the educational benefits of diversity. 
Finally, this Article discusses two relatively novel ways that universities 
can continue to defend their race-conscious admissions policies by linking them 
to race-conscious educational goals.  Employing the deference Fisher gives them 
in defining their educational missions, universities can: (1) Emphasize the 
educational benefits of diversity within racial groups and intragroup support 
among minority students; and (2) highlight the educational benefits of diversity 
that occur within race-conscious campus spaces, such as ethnic studies 
departments, cultural centers, and residence halls devoted to African American 
experiences, in addition to benefits of classroom diversity.  More broadly, this 
Article calls upon universities to embrace race-consciousness—not only in their 
admissions policies but also in their educational missions.  By illustrating that 
their educational missions have race-conscious goals, universities can more 
readily illustrate how their race-conscious admissions policies and programs are 
tangibly related to the educational benefits of diversity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With its ruling in Fisher v. Texas,1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
indicated that it wants to see an end to race-conscious admissions 
policies in higher education.  Although the Fisher majority opinion did 
not strike down the University of Texas at Austin (UT) admissions 
plan, seven Justices2 agreed to remand the case for more stringent 
review of whether UT really needs to use a race-conscious policy, in 
addition to the “race-neutral” Top Ten Percent Law,3 to garner the 
 
 1  133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 2  Of course, there are differing views among the individual Justices.  In past cases, 
Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Chief Justice John 
Roberts have indicated their disdain for race-conscious admissions policies.  See Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) 
(“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.”)  Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented when the Court upheld race-
conscious admissions policies in Grutter v. Bollinger,  539 U.S. 306, 346, 349 (2003) 
(Scalia, Thomas, J.J., dissenting) (contending that diversity in education is not a 
compelling state interest and it is unconstitutional for universities to use race-
conscious admissions policies).  Both also wrote separate concurrences in Fisher 
suggesting that they would overrule Grutter, but that question was not posed to them 
in Fisher.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, Thomas J.J., concurring).  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, who wrote the Fisher majority opinion, also dissented in Grutter, although he 
did not categorically preclude the use of race-conscious admissions policies in his 
dissent.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal 
of considering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity, but 
an educational institution must ensure, through sufficient procedures, that each 
applicant receives individual consideration and that race does not become a 
predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.  The Law School failed to 
comply with this requirement, and by no means has it carried its burden to show 
otherwise by the test of strict scrutiny.”).  Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg voted to uphold race-conscious admissions in Grutter.  Id. at 306.  Justice 
Ginsburg also dissented in Fisher, on grounds that UT’s use of race in admissions had 
already passed strict scrutiny on the lower courts’ initial review.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 
2432 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for 
Equality by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651  (2014) suggests her broad support 
for race-conscious admissions policies.  See id. at 1682 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ( 
“[The Supreme Court] has recognized that diversity in education is paramount . . . 
[w]ith good reason.”).  Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from both Fisher and 
Schuette because of her role in the cases as Solicitor General, when they were being 
considered in the lower courts. 
 3  TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (1997).  The Top Ten Percent Law guarantees 
admissions to UT to the top students (originally top 10 percent of each graduating 
class) in all Texas public high schools.  The law was passed by the Texas legislature in 
response to Hopwood v. Texas.  Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that UT 
could not use race as an admissions factor), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003) (holding that universities could use race as a plus factor in admissions).  In 
2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended to limit guaranteed admission at UT to 
75 percent of the seats designated for Texas residents.  See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 
51.803(a-1) (2010).  This limit begins with admissions to the entering class of Fall 2011 
and continues until the entering class of Fall 2015.  See Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 
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educational benefits of diversity.  The majority opinion stated that 
“strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate burden of 
demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, 
workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice[,]”4 and that “[t]he 
reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-
neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of 
diversity . . .’at tolerable administrative expense.”‘5 
While it did not curb university’s use of race per se, Fisher’s 
preference for race-neutral alternatives illustrates the Court’s overall 
antipathy towards race-conscious admissions.  The Fisher majority 
emphasized that “[n]arrow tailoring . . . requires that the reviewing 
court verify that it is ‘necessary’ for a university to use race to achieve 
the educational benefits of diversity.”6 
 
224 n.56 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
This Article assumes, as the Fisher litigation did, that the Top Ten Percent Law is “race 
neutral”—meaning that there is no direct and explicit consideration of race in the 
decision-making process.  See also Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter?  We May Have 
Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War?,  32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8 (2005) (arguing that “in 
order to be considered race-neutral, it is only necessary that [programs] do not allow 
applicants to be classified and/or selected based on their race or ethnicity”); Reva 
Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the 
Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653, 675 (2015) (noting that the Top Ten Percent Plan 
“pursue[s] a race-conscious goal of promoting equal opportunity” but “does not 
classify individuals by race” and thus does not “trigger[] strict scrutiny”).  See also id. at 
673–74 (noting that in Fisher, Supreme Court Justices could not possibly have 
“overlooked the race- conscious aims of the [Top Ten] percent program[,]” but that 
“[n]o Justice raised questions about the [plan’s] constitutionality[.]”).  But see Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 n.10 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Calling . . . 10% 
or 20% plans ‘race-neutral’ seems to me disingenuous, for they ‘unquestionably were 
adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans 
and Hispanics in the public higher education system.’”); Id. at 298 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“‘[P]ercentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the point scheme (and 
fairly so), but they get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are 
doing or why they are doing it.”); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives [referring to 
Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law] as race unconscious . . . .. . . [T]he vaunted alternatives 
suffer from ‘the disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.’”) (quoting Gratz, 539 U.S. at 
298) (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also Fisher,  631 F.3d at 242 n.156, rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (“A court considering the constitutionality of the [Top Ten Percent Law] 
would examine whether Texas enacted the Law (and corresponding admissions 
policies) because of its effects on identifiable racial groups or in spite of those effects.  
See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); cf. Brief for Social Scientists 
Glenn C. Loury et al. as Amici Curiae  Supporting  Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 
2003 WL 402129, at *2, *9–10 (noting that ‘it is not clear that [percentage] plans are 
actually race-neutral’ and that some amici counsel in Grutter ‘have signaled interest in 
moving on after this case to challenge these aspects of the Texas program.’).”). 
 4  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
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This Article, however, argues that Fisher does not spell doom for 
race-conscious admissions.  While many commentators predicted that 
Fisher would end race-conscious admissions policies,7 it actually 
provided the “best realistic outcome for proponents” of these policies, 
given the current composition of the Supreme Court.8  In fact, after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Fifth Circuit upheld UT’s race-
conscious admissions policy on remand,9 and then denied the Fisher 
Plaintiffs’10 request for a hearing en banc.11  Also, the Supreme Court’s 
more recent opinion in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action12 
did not affect Fisher, even though it was a loss for proponents of race-
conscious admissions.  In Schuette, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit 
and upheld state constitutional bans on race-conscious policies;13 
 
 7  See Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: In With a Bang, Out With a Fizzle, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/ 
fisher-v-university-of-texas-in-with-a-bang-out-with-a-fizzle/ ( “[T]he many months of 
commentary from pundits sounding the death knell on affirmative action in higher 
education after oral argument in Fisher” and that “[f]orecasting the death of race-
conscious policies has become a spectator sport.”). 
 8  Vinay Harpalani, Affirmative Action Survives—For Now, IIT CHICAGO-KENT 
FACULTY BLOG (June 24, 2013), http://blogs.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/2013/ 
06/24/affirmative-action-survives-for-now/.  But see Eboni Nelson, Reading Between the 
Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 519, 521 (2014) (arguing 
that for proponents of race-conscious admissions policies, post-Fisher “optimism may 
be misplaced”).  Additionally, Professors Mario Barnes and Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
along with Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, critique the U.S. Supreme Court’s overall 
approach to equal protection, using Fisher as an example.  See generally Mario L. Barnes, 
Erwin Chemerinsky & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Judging Opportunity Lost: Assessing the 
Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. 
REV. 272 (2015). 
 9  Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), en banc denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th 
Cir. 2014). 
 10  For simplicity’s sake, this Article will refer to the parties who initiated the Fisher 
litigation as the Fisher “Plaintiffs,” although the various Fisher opinions sometimes refer 
to them as “Appellants” or “Plaintiffs-Appellants.”  The Plaintiffs were also the 
“Petitioner” at the Supreme Court (where Abigail Noel Fisher was 
the only remaining Plaintiff).  See Brief for Petitioner, Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(No. 11-345) at 2. For purposes of this Article, all of these terms are interchangeable. 
 11  Denial of Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th 
Cir. 2014) at 2, available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/ 
11.12.14.Denial.of.Petition.for.Rehearing.En.Banc.pdf.  Ten of fifteen Fifth Circuit 
judges voted against the rehearing.  Id.  Judge Emilio Garza, joined by four other 
judges, dissented from the denial.  Id. at 3.  Abigail Fisher has also filed a petition for 
a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, which is pending at this time.  Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2.10.15.Petition.for.Writ.of.Certiorari.p
df. 
 12  Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 13  Id. 
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however, in doing so, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s controlling opinion 
made clear that Schuette was “not about the constitutionality or the 
merits [] of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education . . . 
[or] permissib[ility]”14 of such policies, but rather about whether the 
courts should ultimately decide this issue.15 
Although a majority of Justices would like to see an end to race-
conscious admissions policies, the rulings in Fisher and Schuette suggest 
that Justice Kennedy, along with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, 
would prefer lower courts and political process to accomplish this end, 
rather than a Supreme Court decision.16  After these two rulings, 
universities are permitted to use race-conscious admissions, subject to 
popular referenda,17 legislative18 or executive19 action, and university 
administrative decisions.20  Any of these extrajudicial vehicles can 
 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, slip op. at 18 
(2014) (noting that Schuette “is not about how the debate about race preferences 
should be resolved . . . [i]t is about who may resolve it.”).  It is noteworthy that Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined Justice Kennedy’s Schuette opinion, and also 
that neither of them wrote separately in Fisher—as Justices Scalia and Thomas did to 
express greater disdain for Grutter.  See Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) 
(Scalia, Thomas, J.J., dissenting).  There is little doubt that Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito, and also Justice Kennedy, would like to end to race-conscious admissions 
policies.  See supra note 2.  However, their recent jurisprudence suggests that none of 
them want the Court to deliver a sweeping mandate for universities to do so, perhaps 
preferring to let lower courts and political actors erode the use of race gradually.  See 
Vinay Harpalani, The Double-Consciousness of Race-Consciousness and the Bermuda Triangle 
of University Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 835, 847–50 (2015) (discussing interplay 
of law and politics on future of race-conscious admissions policies). 
 17  California (1996), Washington (1998), Michigan (2006), Nebraska (2008), 
Arizona (2010), and Oklahoma (2012) have all passed state constitutional 
amendments, through referenda, that proscribe race-conscious admissions policies.  
See Affirmative Action: State Action, NCSL (Apr. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx.  Colorado voters rejected a similar ban 
in 2008.  Colleen Slevin, Colorado Voters Reject Affirmative Action Ban, USA TODAY (Nov. 
7, 2008, 7:35 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/2008-11-07-
1129194800_x.htm  (“By 51 percent to 49 percent, Coloradans rejected a proposed 
constitutional ban on considering race or gender in state hiring, contracting and 
college admissions.”). 
 18  New Hampshire’s state legislature passed law curbing race-conscious policies, 
effective in 2012.  H.R. 0623 (N.H. 2011). 
 19  Florida Governor Jeb Bush eliminated race-conscious policies by executive 
order in 1999.  Florida Exec. Order No. 99-281 (1999). 
 20  The University of Georgia and Texas A&M University elected not to reinstate 
race-conscious admissions policies after lower court rulings ruled their policies 
unconstitutional, even though Grutter abrogated those lower court rulings.  See Richard 
D. Kahlenberg, A Better Affirmative Action: State Universities that Created Alternatives to 
Racial Preferences, at 4 (2012), http://tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-abaa.pdf.  Also, 
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eliminate the use of race-conscious policies at the state or local level, 
but absent such political actions, Fisher still allows use of race in 
admissions, and it governs how universities must implement race-
conscious admissions policies to comply with the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Moreover, even as Fisher guides lower courts to stringently review 
whether universities need to use race, the Supreme Court has broadly 
defined the educational benefits of diversity—the compelling interest 
that justifies race-conscious admissions policies.  Some of the 
educational benefits articulated by Fisher inherently incorporate a level 
of race-consciousness, such as “lessening of racial isolation and 
stereotypes,”21 “promot[ing] cross-racial understanding,”22 and 
“enabl[ing] [students] to better understand persons of different 
races.”23  Also, Grutter and Fisher’s compelling interest in diversity (the 
“diversity interest”) goes hand in hand with the Court’s narrow 
tailoring principles—its endorsement of the race-conscious holistic 
admissions policy24 upheld in Grutter, in contrast with its rejection of 
 
prior to the passage of Proposition 209 in California in 1996, the Regents of the 
University of California passed two resolutions, Standing Policy 1 (SP1) and Standing 
Policy 2 (SP2), to eliminate race-conscious admissions policies in 1995.  However, this 
ban did not go into effect until 1998, after Proposition 209 itself had passed.  See 
Appendix D: Legal Landscape, BERKELEY.EDU, http://diversity. berkeley.edu/appendix-
d-legal-landscape (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). 
 21  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  Of course, Fisher recapitulated much of the holding in 
Grutter.  See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) (holding that 
“substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce, include cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes.”); Id. at 319 (noting that “critical mass” entails “numbers such that 
underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for 
their race.’”). 
 22  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce . . . are substantial [and include] promot[ing] ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’  . . . break[ing] down racial stereotypes, and ‘enabl[ing] [students] to 
better understand persons of different races.”). 
 23  Id. 
 24  This Article defines a “holistic” admissions policy as one where various factors, 
from academic achievement to extracurricular activities related to race, are 
subjectively considered together and weighed by admissions reviewers to make 
admissions decisions.  This can be contrasted with an admissions system which gives 
fixed weights to those various factors and applies objective, mechanical formulas to 
determine who should be admitted.  Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (2003) 
(upholding University of Michigan Law School admissions policy, which used race as 
a flexible, individualized plus factor, as part of a holistic admissions process) with Gratz 
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down University of Michigan undergraduate 
admissions policy for College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, which used a 
mechanical point system that automatically awarded 20 points (on a 150 point scale) 
to all self-identifying underrepresented minority applicants).  For further description 
of how holistic admissions processes work, see Scott Jaschik, How They Really Get In, 
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the race-conscious mechanical point system struck down in Gratz v. 
Bollinger.25  The holistic admissions plan upheld in Grutter facilitates the 
race-conscious educational benefits articulated by the Court,26 in a 
manner not readily replicable by race-neutral alternatives.27 
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this diversity interest in 
several cases now, and Justice Anthony Kennedy—the Court’s current 
swing vote—has articulated his support for diversity as a compelling 
interest in various majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.28  
Additionally, in Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher, the Court also gave deference 
to universities in defining their own educational missions to 
incorporate the compelling interest in diversity.29  This deference, in 
 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 9, 2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/ 
2012/04/09/new-research-how-elite-colleges-make-admissions-decisions; Rachel 
Rubin, Who Gets In and Why? An Examination of Admissions to America’s Most Selective 
Colleges and Universities, 2 INT’L EDUC. RES. 1 (2014), http://www. 
todayscience.org/IER/article/ier.v2i2p01.pdf.  
 25  Id.  See also Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416 (“In Grutter, the Court upheld the use of 
race as one of many ‘plus factors’ in an admissions program that considered the overall 
individual contribution of each candidate.  In Gratz, by contrast, the Court held 
unconstitutional Michigan’s undergraduate admissions program, which automatically 
awarded points to applicants from certain racial minorities.”). 
 26  See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463, 494–95 (2012) (explaining how Grutter’s 
compelling interest in diversity is related to its narrow tailoring principles). 
 27  See infra Part II.B. 
 28  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387–88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The [Bakke 
concurring] opinion by  Justice Powell, in my view, states the correct rule for resolving 
[Grutter] . . . Justice Powell’s approval of the use of race in university admissions 
reflected a tradition, grounded in the First Amendment, of acknowledging a 
university’s conception of its educational mission . . . . Our precedents provide a basis 
for the Court’s acceptance of a university’s considered judgment that racial diversity 
among  students can further its educational task . . . .”); Id. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as 
one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity . . .”); Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797–98 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, 
an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.  
Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest  to achieve a diverse student 
population.  Race may be one component of that diversity, but other demographic 
factors, plus special talents and needs, should also be considered.”); Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2418 (2013) (“The attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond 
race alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial 
isolation and stereotypes . . . . The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest 
encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or 
ethnic origin is but a single though important element. . . . In Grutter, the Court 
reaffirmed [Justice Powell’s]  conclusion that obtaining the educational benefits of 
‘student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.’”)(internal citation ommitted).   
 29  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[A] university’s ‘educational judgment that such 
diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.’”) (quoting 
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conjunction with the specific educational benefits of diversity espoused 
by the Court, allows universities to define and implement their 
educational missions in a manner that facilitates defense of race-
conscious admissions.  They can take advantage of the broadly-defined 
compelling interest in diversity and narrowly tailor their race-conscious 
policies and programs to various aspects of this diversity interest.  Fisher 
requires universities to do so, and this Article argues that universities 
can meet this requirement if they embrace race-consciousness more 
broadly in their educational missions.30 
Part I focuses on the broadly-defined compelling interest in 
diversity upheld in Grutter and reinforced in Fisher.  This Part argues 
that unlike remedial rationales for race-conscious policies, the 
compelling interest in diversity has no inherent time limit and no 
inherent ceiling.  It further argues that the notion of “critical mass” of 
minority students—accepted as a “limit” by both parties in Fisher31—
cannot adequately serve this role: the Supreme Court did not even try 
to apply “critical mass” as a limiting principle in Fisher.  This Part also 
contends that Grutter and Fisher’s articulation of the diversity interest 
can readily justify race-consciousness in admissions and in university 
activities: it includes educational benefits such as “lessening of 
racial . . . stereotypes”;32 “promot[ing] cross-racial understanding”;33  
“enabl[ing] [students] to better understand persons of different 
races”;34 and also policies and programs designed to ameliorate 
 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328); see also infra Part III.A (discussing First Amendment basis for 
deference to universities in Justice Lewis Powell’s Bakke opinion). 
 30  The goal of this Article is to aid universities in defending race-conscious 
admissions policies in light of Fisher.  This Article does not attempt to resolve the 
tension in Supreme Court’s doctrine between the broad diversity interest and the call 
for race-neutrality. This tension is likely a result of compromises between various 
Justices on the Court, in conjunction with the Court’s need to maintain institutional 
legitimacy.  See supra note 2; Boddie, supra note 7 (“Fisher may suggest that the Court 
has become concerned about its institutional legitimacy and, therefore, is now wary of 
issuing sweeping decisions that depart radically from precedent.”). 
 31  The parties in Fisher agreed that “critical mass” was a conceptual limit on race-
conscious admissions; they disagreed on whether UT had reached that limit with the 
Top Ten Percent Law alone.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 32  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (holding that 
“substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce, include cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes.”). 
 33  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce . . . are substantial [and include] promot[ing] ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’ . . . break[ing] down racial stereotypes, and ‘enabl[ing] [students] to 
better understand persons of different races’”). 
 34  Id. 
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minority students’ feelings of isolation and tokenism.35 
Part II illustrates how Grutter and Fisher’s narrow tailoring 
principles relate to the compelling interest in diversity.  It argues that 
features of holistic admissions, such as individualized review and 
nuanced consideration of race, facilitate the diversity interest and 
necessitate race-consciousness to do so.  Further, this Part illustrates 
that a holistic admissions policy with individualized review cannot be 
entirely race-neutral.  It also contends that elite universities already 
place a de facto limit on their use of race in admissions, through their 
own academic selectivity.  This de facto limit already precludes elite 
universities from attaining levels of racial diversity and related 
educational benefits which they may desire.  For all of these reasons, 
Fisher’s call for stringent review of race-conscious admissions policies 
need not lead to their demise. 
Part III illustrates how universities can use the broadly-defined 
compelling interest in diversity, facilitated by narrowly-tailored 
policies, to defend race-conscious admissions and highlight 
educational benefits that necessitate such policies.  This Part first 
reviews the Supreme Court’s deference to universities in defining their 
educational missions.  It then focuses on two novel ways that 
universities can bring not only diversity, but race-consciousness itself 
in their educational missions: (1) emphasizing the educational 
benefits of diversity within racial groups and intragroup support 
among minority students; and (2) highlighting the educational 
benefits of diversity and support for minority students that occur 
within race-conscious campus spaces,36 such as residence halls devoted 
to African American experiences.  These race-conscious goals 
underscore the need for race-conscious admissions policies to attain 
the educational benefits of diversity. 
The Conclusion reiterates these points and also calls upon 
universities to embrace race-consciousness more broadly.  Future 
defense of race-conscious admissions will require that universities be 
assertive about the importance of race, not only in their admissions 
processes, but also in their educational missions and activities in 
everyday campus life. 
 
 35  Id. at 319 (noting that minority students should not “feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race”). 
 36  This Article operationally defines a “race-conscious campus space” as a physical 
campus location or campus initiative or activity that focuses on racial identity, whether 
for a specified racial group or in a more general sense (i.e., a campus lecture or film 
series on race). 
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I. BROAD SCOPE OF THE COMPELLING INTEREST IN 
DIVERSITY 
The Supreme Court has adopted a broad notion of the 
compelling interest in diversity,37 allowing universities to incorporate 
race-consciousness in their educational missions in various ways.  The 
Court has given deference to universities in defining their educational 
missions, while specifically noting educational goals that directly 
implicated race: lessening racial stereotypes, facilitating cross-racial 
dialogue, and mitigating feelings of isolation and tokenism among 
minority students.38  These are all important undertakings that 
facilitate the educational benefits of diversity, and there is no reason 
to believe their importance will diminish in the foreseeable future. 
A. Educational Benefits of Diversity: What are the Limits? 
“Super-precedent”39 is how Professor Mark Kende describes 
Justice Lewis Powell’s concurring opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke,40 which first articulated and endorsed the 
compelling interest in diversity in 1978.  Professor Kende notes that 
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion “has shown stunning vitality given its 
original fragility.”41  Although no other Justice joined Justice Powell in 
 
 37  Justice Clarence Thomas noted this in his Grutter dissent, where he states that 
the “compelling state interest . . . [in diversity] . . . is actually broader than might 
appear at first glance.”).  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 38  See supra notes 21–23. 
 39  Mark Kende, Is Bakke Now a ‘Super-Precedent’ and Does It Matter? The U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Updated Constitutional Approach to Affirmative Action in Fisher, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 15, 16–17 (2013), available at https://www. 
law.upenn.edu/live/files/2626-kendefinal-16upajconstlonline15.pdf (defining super 
precedent as a “doctrinal, or decisional foundation for subsequent lines of judicial 
decision . . . that take[s] on a special status . . . as [a] landmark opinion, so encrusted 
and deeply embedded in constitutional law that [it] . . . become[s] practically immune 
to reconsideration and reversal.”) (quoting Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205–06 (2006)). 
 40  438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he attainment of a 
diverse student body . . . clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution 
of higher education.”).  Justice Powell stated that while racial set-asides were 
unconstitutional, race could be used as an individual “plus” factor for applicants, in 
order to achieve the compelling interest of attaining the educational benefits of 
diversity.  Id. at 317 (“[R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a ‘plus’ in a 
particular applicant’s file . . . [and] . . .  does not insulate the individual from 
comparison with all other candidates for the available seats.”).  Justice Powell cited 
Harvard College’s admissions program as a model for a constitutionally permissible 
race-conscious policy.  Id. at 316 (“Harvard College has expanded the concept of 
diversity to include students from disadvantaged economic, racial and ethnic 
groups . . . [but]  [i]n Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-
quotas for the number of blacks . . . .”). 
 41  Kende, supra note 39, at 18. 
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Bakke, his opinion set the framework for implementing and evaluating 
race-conscious admissions policies—particularly the educational 
benefits of diversity that constitutionally justify such policies.42 
Twenty-five years after Bakke, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger both affirmed and provided the 
most elaborate discussion of the diversity interest in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.43  Professor Devon Carbado identifies eight benefits of 
diversity that Justice O’Connor espouses in her Grutter majority 
opinion: diversity serves to “[1] promote speech and the robust 
exchange of ideas . . . [2] effectuate the inclusion of underrepresented 
students . . . [3] change the character of the school . . . [4] disrupt and 
negate racial stereotypes . . . [5] facilitate racial cooperation and 
understanding . . . [6] create pathways to leadership . . . [7] ensure 
democratic legitimacy . . . [and] . . . [8] prevent racial isolation and 
alienation[.]”44  Grutter’s articulation of the diversity interest, which was 
affirmed in Fisher,45 shows how the educational benefits of diversity for 
society are long-term, occur at the societal and campus/classroom 
levels, and are tied to race in a nuanced manner. 
These benefits—now thrice adopted by the Supreme Court as a 
compelling interest46—have no obvious or intuitive end point.  At the 
Supreme Court oral argument in Fisher, Chief Justice Roberts pressed 
UT counsel Gregory Garre on the “logical end point” of race-conscious 
 
 42  Id. at 18 (“Hundreds of educational institutions, workplaces, and lower courts 
have adopted programs modeled on [Justice Powell’s Bakke] opinion.”). 
 43  See supra notes 33–35.  Of course, there are also many social science studies and 
reports that examine the educational benefits of diversity.  See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN 
& DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING 
RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998); Expert Witness Report of Patricia 
Y. Gurin, at 12, Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-
75321), 1998 WL 35140040, reprinted in 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (1999); Patricia 
Gurin, Biren A. Nagda & Gretchen E. Lopez, The Benefits of Diversity in Education for 
Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 17 (2004); Brief for Am. Educ. Research Ass’n 
et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 
11-345). 
 44  Devon Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1145–46 (2013).  
For a broader discussion of diversity, as distinguished from remedial justifications for 
affirmative action, see Stacy L. Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity: Moving Beyond 
the Affirmative Action Debate to Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE L. 
75 (2012). 
 45  See supra notes 28–29.  
 46  See supra notes 28–29, 33–35, 40. 
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admissions,47 but Mr. Garre did not have an adequate answer.48  Neither 
the oral argument nor the Fisher opinion itself, shed light on any such 
“logical end point.”49 
There are two different ways50 to think about a potential limit on 
the compelling interest in diversity that would serve as such a “logical 
end point.”  First, there could be time in the future when diversity is 
no longer a compelling interest, such that using race in admissions is 
not constitutionally justified.  This would constitute a temporal 
endpoint for the diversity interest itself.  Second, there could be a 
particular level of the educational benefits of diversity which, if 
attainable by race-neutral means, would also constitutionally proscribe 
use of race.  This would be a “ceiling” on diversity interest—or at least 
on the amount of diversity benefits compelling enough to justify use of 
race-conscious admissions policies. 
The first of these—a temporal end point for the diversity 
interest—seems unlikely.  If diversity is a compelling interest now, it 
would probably be even more so in the future, as American society 
becomes more diverse and the global economy becomes more 
prominent.  Given the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmation of the 
diversity interest, a time limit for diversity’s educational benefits does 
not follow from either socio-historical trends or legal precedent.51 
The second potential limit—a “ceiling”—was the basis of the 
Plaintiffs’ claim in Fisher: they contended that UT had attained a 
“critical mass” of minority students by race-neutral means and thus did 
not need to use race-conscious admissions to attain the educational 
benefits of diversity.52  Not surprisingly, this issue came up during the 
 
 47  Transcript of Oral Argument, at 47, Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 
11-345).  See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (“[R]ace-conscious 
admissions policies must be limited in time. . . . [A]ll governmental use of race must 
have a logical end point.”). 
 48  Mr. Garre only offered that such an end point would occur when 
“underrepresented minorities . . . do not feel like spokespersons for their race, . . . 
[where] an environment where cross-racial understanding is promoted, . . .[and] 
educational benefits of diversity are realized[.]”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra 
note 47, at 49.  Given that race-conscious admissions policies would be in place to help 
attain these goals (whenever in the future they might be attained), Mr. Garre’s 
response did not address how a university would maintain these educational benefits 
of diversity without race-conscious policies at any time in the future. 
 49  See infra Part I.B.2; Vinay Harpalani, Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 57, 58–66 (2013). 
 50  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 503 n.172. 
 51  Of course, a change in Supreme Court composition could affect the diversity 
interest, but it would require the Court to overturn several of its relatively recent 
opinions.  See supra notes 28–29, 33–35, 40. 
 52  See infra Part I.B. 
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Supreme Court oral argument in Fisher, when Chief Justice Roberts 
intensely questioned Mr. Garre about “critical mass” and the “logical 
end point” of UT’s race-conscious admissions policy.53  Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court’s Fisher opinion did not rely on “critical mass” or 
provide further guidance on a limit to the diversity interest.  Under the 
Grutter/Fisher diversity framework, it would be exceedingly difficult to 
define one. 
1. Temporal End Point?: “Ageless into the Future” 
At the societal level, Justice O’Connor noted student body 
diversity “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse 
workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”54  
Justice O’Connor also highlighted the importance of student diversity 
for success in an “increasingly global marketplace[,]”55 and for the 
military to assure American’s national security interests.56  The Grutter 
majority thus concluded that “[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders 
with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path 
to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of 
every race and ethnicity.”57 
All of these reasons to pursue diversity and its educational benefits 
will be valid into the foreseeable future: they will probably become 
even more important as America becomes a more diverse society.  The 
compelling interest in diversity is different from other compelling state 
interests such as national security emergencies,58  because diversity is 
not inherently limited in time and scope—the compelling interest 
does not end once the emergency passes.  Prior to Grutter, in Wygant v. 
 
 53  See supra notes 47–49. 
 54  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (quoting Brief for American 
Educational Research Association et al. as Amici Curiae 3). 
 55  Id. at 308 (“[M]ajor American businesses have made clear that the skills needed 
in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to 
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”). 
 56  Id. at 331 (“[H]igh-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United 
States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly 
qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill 
its principle mission to provide national security.”). 
 57  Id. at 332.  See also Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
313 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this 
Nation of many peoples.”).  See also Carbado, supra note 44, at 1145–46 (listing societal 
and campus/classroom benefits of diversity in Justice O’Connor’s Grutter majority 
opinion). 
 58  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2311, 2423 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Court [has] recognized that protecting national security may satisfy [the] exacting 
standard [of strict scrutiny].”) (citing Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944)). 
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Jackson Board of Education59 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,60  the 
Supreme Court struck down race-conscious policies that were rooted 
in broad, remedial rationales rather than diversity.  The Croson Court 
limited remedial rationales to “the ‘focused’ goal of remedying 
“wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination.”61  It 
rejected “the remedying of the effects of ‘societal discrimination,’”62 as 
a compelling interest, because societal discrimination constituted “an 
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the 
past.”63  The Court’s distinction here was tied directly to the 
termination of the remedy: it is much easier to determine the “logical 
end point”64 of a focused remedy for specific instances of 
discrimination than it is for a broad remedy of societal discrimination. 
However, when upholding and defining the compelling interest 
in diversity, the Grutter majority did not follow this reasoning.  Just as 
societal discrimination “may be ageless in its reach into the past,”65 
diversity is ageless in its reach into the future.66  Justice O’Connor’s 
Grutter opinion did state that as part of its narrow tailoring 
requirement, “all race-conscious admissions programs have a 
termination point.”67  However, as Professor Ronald Krotoszynski 
notes: 
We should expect that at some discrete time in the future 
efforts to remediate past discrimination, unlike diversity 
programs, will have some natural stopping point: when the 
contemporary effects of the past discrimination have been 
completely negated, when the contemporary effects of the 
past discrimination are so attenuated that nothing is left to 
remediate, or some combination of the two.  On the other 
 
 59  476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 60  488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 61  Id. at 497–98 (quoting Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 308–09 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 62  Id. at 498 (quoting Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 308–09 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 63  Id. 
 64  See supra note 49. 
 65  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307. 
 66  The Supreme Court also missed this point in its analysis of Parents Involved.  
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729 (2007) 
(“[W]orking backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than 
working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the 
purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent.”).  Here, the Court 
does not acknowledge the fact that even if the “level of diversity” could be identified 
and measured reliably and consistently, there is no logical end point when it can 
necessarily be achieved without race-conscious measures. 
 67  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 510). 
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hand, diversity programs should in theory be relevant so long 
as we believe that pluralism is relevant to the excellence and 
success . . .68 
Unlike remediation for past government discrimination, the diversity 
interest has not been limited in scope by Supreme Court doctrine.  In 
fact, Grutter and Fisher give deference to universities in defining their 
educational missions69—thus allowing them to espouse a broad notion 
of the educational benefits of diversity. 
In a similar vein, Professor Stacy Hawkins contrasts remedial and 
aspirational aims initiatives and critiques Grutter for its “use of a 
remedial fit test for the aspirational diversity interest . . .”:70 
[U]nlike a remedial goal, which once achieved cannot justify 
continued use of race-conscious measures, the diversity 
interest may in fact entail both achieving and maintaining 
diversity. . . . It is both logical and reasonable to presume that 
remedies entail finite goals.  It is less logical and not 
altogether clear that the aspirational goals of diversity are as 
finite or circumscribed.71 
The narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny must be 
interpreted in a context-specific manner,72 and a broader compelling 
interest such as diversity necessitates “broader” narrow tailoring 
principles.  It is difficult to fashion or even conceive of a time-limited 
remedy for the diversity interest.  In spite of its pressing desire to end 
 
 68  Ronald J. Krotoszynski, The Argot of Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling 
“Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 936–37 (2010).  (“If diversity is generally a good thing and, in 
any case, often demonstrably correlates positively to enhanced results, there should 
not be any need to sunset diversity programs . . . . Does anyone think that learning in 
an all-white, all-male college or university will ever be superior to learning in a 
comprehensively integrated environment? . . . If one viewed the law school’s program 
in Grutter, at least with respect to race, as either remedial in nature or as a dual effort 
at both diversity and remediation, a sunset requirement would make perfect sense.  
After all, once a governmental entity has remediated the present effects of past 
discrimination, there would be no need for further remedial efforts.  What we see, 
then, is that the Supreme Court itself tends to revert into a remedial mindset even 
when, in theory, discussing a diversity program.”).  Id. at 935–36. 
 69  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“[A] university’s ‘educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we 
defer.’”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). 
 70  Hawkins, supra note 44, at 108. 
 71  Id. at 110. 
 72  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333–34 (“[T]he contours of the narrow-tailoring inquiry 
with respect to race-conscious university admissions programs . . . must be calibrated 
to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student body diversity in 
public higher education.”); Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Narrow 
Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. LAW REV. 517, 518 (“[T]he narrow tailoring 
requirement has always had multiple dimensions.”). 
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race-conscious policies, the Supreme Court has not resolved this 
incongruity in its own doctrine.73  Nevertheless, universities can draw 
upon the broad diversity interest to defend their continued use of race-
conscious admissions policies.74 
2. Ceiling: How Much Diversity is Enough? 
In addition to lacking an intuitive time limit, the compelling 
interest in diversity also lacks an intuitive “ceiling”—a limit on amount 
of diversity for which race-conscious policies are allowable.75  Professor 
Ian Ayres and Sydney Foster argue that narrow tailoring should allow 
only the “minimum necessary preference” based on race to attain the 
educational benefits of diversity,76 but even they acknowledge that “[i]t 
is difficult to quantify the burdens of racial preferences and even more 
difficult to quantify government interests in nonremedial affirmative 
action.”77  There is no obvious point at which greater diversity no 
longer yields additional benefits. 
In theory, it may be possible to define a diversity ceiling by 
reference to a diminishing returns principle.  As I argue in one of my 
prior articles, “given the time and space constraints, students cannot 
experience all perspectives and educational opportunities that might 
be available in classrooms and on campuses more generally.”78  After a 
 
 73  Hawkins, supra note 44, at 107 (critiquing Grutter for “reflexive reliance on . . . 
traditional remedial analysis[,] . . . [and] . . .  [s]uccumbing to . . . analytic trap . . . 
[of] appl[ying] the narrow tailoring standard developed in . . . the context of remedial 
affirmative action cases to . . . [the] . . . diversity interest”).  There are different ways 
to resolve this doctrinal inconsistency.  One could take the view, as Justice Thomas 
does, that for these reasons, diversity should not be a compelling interest.  Fisher, 133 
S. Ct. at 2423–24 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Grutter was a radical departure from our 
strict-scrutiny precedents. . . . [T]here is nothing ‘pressing’ or ‘necessary’ about 
obtaining whatever educational benefits may flow from racial diversity.”).  Conversely, 
one could take the view that the Court should recognize that the compelling interest 
that justifies race-conscious admissions policies is not just diversity, but also partly 
remediation.  See Krotoszynski, supra note 68, at 936–37.  Under this view, the end 
point for race-conscious admissions policies would be elimination of the academic 
disparities that necessitate them.  See infra Part II.D.2.  Finally, one could offer a narrow 
tailoring test that specifically fits the diversity interest rather than remedial 
justifications; See Hawkins, supra note 44, at 111 (arguing that “Justice Powell’s opinion 
in Bakke offers a useful model of the strict scrutiny analysis well-suited to the interest 
in diversity.”).  This Article does not suggest a specific doctrinal resolution: rather, it 
aims to guide universities in defending their race-conscious admissions policies given 
all of the inconsistencies in the current doctrine.  
 74  See infra Part III. 
 75  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 503 n.172. 
 76  Ayres & Foster, supra note 72, at 576. 
 77  Id. at 583. 
 78  Harpalani, supra note 26, at 527. 
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certain level, the costs typically associated with race-conscious 
admissions policies—”stigmatic harm” of using race,79 the 
constitutional burden on non-minority applicants,80 or the purported 
harm to minority students (i.e., “mismatch” theory)81—might outweigh 
any additional educational benefits of diversity.82 
But the determination of this point would be largely arbitrary, 
contingent on subjective value judgments about the relative costs and 
benefits of attaining diversity at a particular institution.83  Given the 
deference that Grutter and Fisher grant to universities in defining their 
educational missions, it is difficult to see how courts could fashion a 
judicially manageable standard to assess the costs and benefits of 
diversity across cases. 
Of course, courts could try to set other artificial limits on the 
diversity interest that are more readily assessable.  However, Bakke and 
Grutter both ruled that the most consistent and reliable method to 
 
 79  See id. at 487–89 (“In the Supreme Court’s recent race jurisprudence, stigmatic 
harm can be understood as the [constitutional] harm that occurs when a government 
policy reinforces racial stereotypes.”).  This is different from specific, tangible harm to 
any individual; see also Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (“Classifications based on 
race carry a danger of stigmatic harm . . . . [T[hey may . . . promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility[.]”); cf. Richard H. Pildes & Richard 
G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07 (1993) (“An 
expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a 
governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences 
the action brings about . . . . Public policies can violate the Constitution not only 
because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they convey 
demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values . . . . [Such] harm is not 
concrete to particular individuals . . . [but] lies in the disruption to constitutionally 
underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values.”). 
 80  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (“To be narrowly tailored, a 
race-conscious admissions program must not ‘unduly burden individuals who are not 
members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.’”) (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Ayres & Foster, 
supra note 72, at 558 (discussing Grutter’s “no-undue-burden requirement.”); 
Harpalani, supra note 26, at 528–29 (discussing “undue burden” as a potential limiting 
principle on race-conscious admissions.). 
 81  See RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 
(2012).  For critiques of mismatch theory, see William Kidder & Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Still Hazy After All These Years: The Lack of Empirical Evidence and Logic Supporting 
Mismatch, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 895 (2014) (critiquing Sander & Taylor, supra note 81); 
Stacy L. Hawkins, Mismatched Or Counted Out? How Mismatch Theory Is Incomplete, What’s 
Missing, and Why It Matters, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 869 (2015). 
 82  Harpalani, supra note 26, at 527. 
 83  Professors Ayres and Foster do recommend such a cost-benefit analysis, but even 
they “recognize that the cost and benefit quanta are difficult to compare.”  Ayres & 
Foster, supra note 72, at 580. 
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measure diversity, proportional representation of minority students 
relative to some external locality, is “patently unconstitutional”—as is 
any numerical target for minority enrollment.84  The one standard that 
courts could most consistently apply in judicial review is precisely the 
standard that the Supreme Court does not want them to apply.85 
For this reason, the concept of a “critical mass” of minority 
students took center stage in the Fisher litigation—as a potential 
“ceiling” and limiting principle for race-conscious admissions.  The 
parties agreed on “critical mass” as a standard: they argued about 
whether UT had enrolled a “critical mass” of minority students with 
the Top Ten Percent Law alone.  Nevertheless, Fisher itself 
demonstrated that “critical mass” has not been defined precisely 
enough to work effectively as a limiting principle for race-conscious 
admissions policies. 
B. Critical Mass Conundrum 
The idea of a “critical mass” of minority students derives from the 
Grutter litigation and opinion.  The Grutter majority elaborated on 
Justice Powell’s articulation of the diversity interest—in a manner that 
implicates the nuanced benefits of race-consciousness on campus and 
in the classroom.  In his Bakke concurrence, Justice Powell focused on 
race as one of many important student characteristics, stating that the 
compelling interest is “not an interest in simple ethnic diversity . . . 
[but rather] . . . encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.”86  Grutter’s articulation of diversity interest 
incorporated this nuance, by introducing the concept of a “critical 
mass” of minority students—an idea that has generated much 
 
 84  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (“If 
petitioner’s purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of 
a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential 
purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid.  Preferring 
members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is 
discrimination for its own sake.  This the Constitution forbids.”).  Id.; Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 329–30 (“The Law School’s interest is not simply ‘to assure within its student body 
some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic 
origin.’ . . . That would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently 
unconstitutional.”). 
 85  For a general explanation of why the Supreme Court has ruled proportional 
representation and numerical goals to be unconstitutional, see Harpalani, supra note 
26, at 485–95. 
 86  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J., concurring).  This language was quoted twice 
in Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013). 
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discussion and confusion.87  “Critical mass” was supposed to be more 
nuanced than a numerical target, but at least in Fisher, it proved to be 
much more elusive as well. 
1. “Critical Mass” and the Compelling Interest in Diversity 
In articulating the meaning of “critical mass,” Justice O’Connor 
noted that: 
[T]he Law School’s concept of critical mass is defined by 
reference to the educational benefits that diversity is 
designed to produce. . . . These benefits are substantial.  As 
the District Court emphasized, the Law School’s admissions 
policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps to break 
down racial stereotypes, and “enables [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.”88 
Accordingly, the Grutter majority concluded that: “when a critical mass 
of underrepresented minority students is present, racial stereotypes 
lose their force because nonminority students learn there is no 
“minority viewpoint” but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.”89  Thus, Grutter tied the notion of “critical mass” directly to 
the educational benefits of diversity—specifically “promot[ing] cross-
racial understanding” and “break[ing] down racial stereotypes.”90  
Similarly, Fisher later described these benefits as “lessening of racial 
isolation and stereotypes[,]”91 and “enabl[ing] [students] to better 
understand persons of different races.”92 
 
 
 87  See generally Harpalani, supra note 49. 
 88  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 330; see also id. at 308 (holding that “the Law School defines 
its critical mass concept by reference to the substantial, important, and laudable 
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce, including cross-racial 
understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes . . . . Thus, the Law School 
has a compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body”). 
 89  Id. at 319–20.  See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for 
critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express 
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ . . . To the contrary, diminishing 
the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and 
one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”).  This 
language in Grutter speaks to the immediate, proximal impact of having a critical mass 
but it still does not suggest how to determine if it is present—an issue that was at play 
in Fisher, but which the Supreme Court did not address in its Fisher opinion.  See infra 
Parts II.B. and II.C. 
 90  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 91  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (holding that 
“substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce, include[e] cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial 
stereotypes”). 
 92  Id. 
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Additionally, the Grutter majority opinion did point to the trial 
phase of Grutter, where the University of Michigan Law School argued 
that “critical mass” does not imply any particular number or 
percentage, but rather “numbers such that underrepresented minority 
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”93  In 
this vein, the concept of “critical mass” ties the educational benefits of 
diversity to the feelings and experiences of underrepresented 
minorities on campus.  As Professor Bennett Capers notes: 
[C]ritical mass is not solely numerical.  Rather, a critical mass 
implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on 
display, where one does not feel the opprobrium of being a 
token, nor the burden of being the designated representative 
for an entire group. It also implies a climate where one can 
speak freely, where one not only has a voice, but a voice that 
will be heard.94 
Both the Grutter majority and Professor Capers recognized that in 
order to attain the educational benefits of diversity—breaking down 
racial stereotypes and facilitating cross-racial understanding—minority 
students cannot feel isolated or tokenized.  One can thus view the 
compelling interest in diversity that justifies race-conscious admissions 
combining two related aspects: (1) Tangible educational benefits such 
breaking down stereotypes and promoting interactions between 
students of different races; and (2) Mitigation of feelings of isolation 
and tokenism among minority students, so that these educational 
benefits can occur.  At the Supreme Court argument, both parties in 
Fisher focused on the latter. 
2. Measuring Critical Mass: A Critical Mess 
Both the Fisher Plaintiffs and UT agreed that a “critical mass” is 
attained when minority students no longer feel “isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.”  The Fisher Plaintiffs combined 
numerical goals with the notion of critical mass.  They contended that 
UT should define, ex ante,95 specific numerical criteria for critical 
mass, such as a range or target enrollment where minority students are 
no longer isolated.96  At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel Bert Rein 
 
 93  Id. at 319. 
 94  I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004). 
 95  See Harpalani, supra note 49, at 59 (noting that Plaintiff’s counsel Bert Rein 
“contended that specific numerical criteria for critical mass, such as a range or target 
enrollment where minority students are no longer isolated, should be defined ex ante 
by the University”). 
 96  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 19 (noting that Plaintiff’s 
counsel Bert Rein argued that “having a range, a view as to what would be an 
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stated that absence of such a standard for critical mass was “a flaw in . . . 
Grutter[,]”97 and asked the Court to require a judicially reviewable 
standard.98  When Justice Sonia Sotomayor urged Mr. Rein to define 
the “standard of critical mass,” asking him what “fixed number” is 
sufficient, Mr. Rein replied that it was “not [the Plaintiffs’] burden to 
establish that number.”99 
However, it is difficult to understand the Fisher Plaintiffs’ view of 
critical mass as “a range” as distinct from a numerical goal/target (even 
if it is a flexible one).  Bakke and Grutter proscribed such numerical 
goals,100 and Justice Sotomayor pressed Mr. Rein on this point at the 
oral argument: “Boy, it sounds awfully like a quota to me that you 
shouldn’t be setting goals, that you shouldn’t be setting quotas . . . .”101  
It is not possible for university to know ex ante whether any particular 
number or percentage of minority students would significantly curb 
feelings of isolation among minority students.  Such feelings of 
isolation, alienation, and tokenism depend on more than minority 
student numbers.  While representation is important, student support 
services and resources, availability of minority faculty and staff 
mentors, and many other factors contribute to whether minority 
students feel isolated and marginalized.102  Even if quotas were not 
 
appropriate level of comfort, critical mass” is necessary for narrow tailoring of race-
conscious admissions policies.). 
 97  Id. at 13 (noting that Plaintiffs’ counsel Bert Rein stated that not having working 
criteria for critical mass is “a flaw . . . in Grutter” and that the Supreme Court should 
“restate that principle.”). 
 98  Id.  
 99  Id. at 16–17. 
 100  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (“The Law School’s interest 
is not simply to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular 
group merely because of its race or ethnic origin . . . [t]hat would amount to outright 
racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.”) (citing Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
 101  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 20.  But see Sheldon Lyke, Catch 
Twenty-Wu? The Oral Argument in Fisher v. University of Texas and the Obfuscation of 
Critical Mass, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 216 (2013) (arguing that “critical mass 
has both quantitative and qualitative elements” and that  “contrary to Justice 
Sotomayor’s claim[,] . . . goals and quotas are [not] synonymous[.]”). 
 102  See William C. Kidder, The Salience of Racial Isolation: African Americans’ and 
Latinos’ Perceptions of Climate and Enrollment Choices with and without Proposition 209, 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT UCLA, at 13 (Oct. 2012), 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/affirmative-action/the-
salience-of-racial-isolation-african-americans2019-and-latinos2019-perceptions-of-
climate-and-enrollment-choices-with-and-without-proposition-209/Kidder_Racial-
Isolation_CRP_final_Oct2012-w-table.pdf (“Notwithstanding the complexities of racial  
climate and critical mass . . . data from leading research universities show that higher 
levels of racial diversity are generally better for the campus climate faced by African 
American students, whereas racial isolation in combination with an affirmative action 
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unconstitutional, the Fisher Plaintiffs’ view would be problematic. 
Unlike the Plaintiffs, UT argued that critical mass should be 
measured ex post.  UT argued that courts could review the presence 
of a critical mass via surveys on isolation felt by minority students and 
related criteria,103 rather than determining it by an ex ante numerical 
goal.  However, UT also did not offer any standard for measuring 
critical mass.  When Chief Justice Roberts asked UT’s counsel, Gregory 
Garre, “Grutter said there has to be a logical end point to your use of 
race[] . . .  [w]hen will I know that you’ve reached a critical mass?”104  
Mr. Garre’s response was that “we look to feedback directly from 
students about racial isolation that they experience.  Do they feel like 
spokespersons for their race.”105  Further, he argued that courts could 
review university’s determinations in this regard, by looking to surveys 
of students and other sources.106 
Chief Justice Roberts did not seem impressed with this answer,107 
and contrary to the entire discourse in Fisher, attainment of a critical 
mass is not the logical end point for race-conscious admissions.  First, 
even if the criteria noted by Mr. Garre could be reliably assessed,108 they 
 
ban is associated with a more inhospitable racial climate.”); Id. at 5 (“The data lend 
support to the concept of ‘critical mass’ while acknowledging that context matters and 
it is unrealistic to expect an across-the-board numerical definition of what constitutes 
sufficient critical mass.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise:  An Empirical Analysis of 
a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010) 
(acknowledging “the power of creating critical mass and a diverse classroom” but 
noting that “stigma and racism . . . were still present”); Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race 
Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 660 (2009) (examining the ways in which Latinas/os respond 
to racial microaggressions and confront hostile campus racial climates); JULIE J. PARK, 
WHEN DIVERSITY DROPS: RACE, RELIGION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2013) (analyzing impact of racial diversity on campus life). 
 103  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 48.  
 104  Id. at 46; Justice Sotomayor also asked Mr. Garre a similar question.  See id. at 49 
(“[W]hen do we stop deferring to the University’s judgment that race is still necessary?  
That’s the bottom line of this case.”). 
 105  Id. at 47. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. (Chief Justice Roberts snidely asking Mr. Garre, “So you, what, you conduct 
a survey and ask students if they fell racially isolated? . . . And that’s the basis for our 
Constitutional determination?”). 
 108  See, e.g., William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the 
Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 63 (2013) (“The benefits associated with ‘critical mass’ 
are highly context-dependent and not amenable to a one-size-fits-all admissions target, 
but these benefits are no less real and measurable because they are manifest in the 
complex system of higher learning.”).  Chancellor Kidder’s assertion about critical 
mass here also distinguishes between two different uses of the concept: (1) 
Universities’ campus-specific determinations of diversity’s benefits and minority 
students’ needs, which this Article endorses (see supra note 102); and (2) Courts’ use 
of critical mass as a generalizable standard to review the constitutionality of race-
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do not signal any logical end point.  If race-conscious policies were 
necessary to achieve a conducive, non-isolating environment for 
minority students in the first place, how would a university maintain 
such an environment if it stopped using those race-conscious policies?  
As Professor Hawkins notes, “the diversity interest may in fact entail 
both achieving and maintaining diversity.”109  UT’s argument regarding 
critical mass and the “logical end point”110 for race-conscious policies 
was not very logical,111 and the entire Fisher litigation missed the 
important point of maintaining (as opposed to merely achieving) a 
critical mass112—which involves not only numerical representation of 
minority students, but also a conducive environment for these 
students.113 
Second, it is likely that some percentage of minority students will 
feel “isolated or like spokespersons” for the foreseeable future, even if 
minority enrollment increases significantly.114  In Grutter, the University 
of Michigan Law School did not actually contend that it had reached 
a “critical mass” of any minority group; rather, it contended only that 
its race-conscious admissions policy “seeks” to attain this “goal.”115  If 
 
conscious admissions policies, which this Article critiques.  See also Kidder, supra note 
102, at 13 (“The data lend support to the concept of ‘critical mass’ while 
acknowledging that context matters and it is unrealistic to expect an across-the-board 
numerical definition of what constitutes sufficient critical mass.”). 
 109  Hawkins, supra note 44, at 110. 
 110  See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 111  Cf. Hawkins, supra note 44, at 107 (“It is both logical and reasonable to presume 
that remedies entail finite goals.  It is less logical and not altogether clear that the 
aspirational goals of diversity are as finite or circumscribed.”).   
 112  To be fair to Mr. Garre and UT, Chief Justice Roberts misframed the question.  
See supra text accompanying note 104.  If critical mass could be defined, then the 
logical end point of race-conscious admissions would not be when critical mass was 
merely attained, but rather when it could be both attained and maintained without 
using race.  
 Professor Elise Boddie argues that with careful assessment of campus social dynamics 
and demographics, a university may be able to operationally determine a numerical 
range that constitutes a critical mass and then stop using race in a given admissions 
cycle—once the number of admitted minority students falls within that range.  Elise 
Boddie, Critical Mass and the Paradox of Colorblind Individualism in Equal Protection, 17 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L 781, 817-18 (2015).  Nevertheless, although this could be a limiting 
principle on race-conscious admissions—a ceiling of sorts—it would not be a logical 
end point.  Race-conscious policies would resume at the beginning of each admissions 
cycle and continue until the critical mass is attained for that cycle.  For further 
discussion of the logical end point of race-conscious admissions policies, see infra Part 
II.D.2. 
 113  See supra notes 88–94, 102, 105–106, and accompanying text. 
 114  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 115  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (“As part of its goal of 
‘assembling a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and broadly 
diverse,’ the Law School seeks to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.”‘) 
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the standard for “critical mass” is an environment where most minority 
students no longer feel isolated, then it is likely that no predominantly-
White university has ever had a “critical mass” because studies suggest 
that many minority students still feel quite isolated and tokenized on 
college campuses.116  The novelty of the college experience itself 
produces feelings of isolation among some students of all racial 
backgrounds—and such feeling may be exacerbated by the 
experiences of minority students.  All of these suggest reasons to 
augment race-conscious policies, rather than to stop them. 
Third, “critical mass” itself can vary between universities based on 
local demographics and politics, or based on the institution’s history 
and educational mission, all of which are also evolving.  It may also be 
different for different racial groups.117  Universities can continue to 
argue that increasing minority enrollment brings them closer to a 
“critical mass” and that race-conscious policies serve to help minority 
students feel less isolated.  “Critical mass,” however, is an imprecise, 
hypothetical concept, and it would be difficult to devise a consistent 
standard to determine whether an institution has attained a “critical 
mass,”118 or to apply any standard developed in one case to another.  If 
universities themselves, with their expertise, cannot determine what a 
“critical mass” is, then how can courts use it as a test for the 
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies? 
Measurement of the diversity interest, in this vein, does not 
present any judicially manageable standard.119  Perhaps the most 
defining moment at the Fisher Supreme Court oral argument was when 
 
(emphasis added).  The University of Michigan Law School’s brief in Grutter also 
suggests that enrollment of a “critical mass” is a “hope” rather than an outcome it 
attains each year.  See Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) 
(No. 02-241), 2003 WL 402236 at 13 (“[T]he Law School hopes that its policy will enroll 
a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.”) (emphasis added).  See also Harpalani, supra 
note 26, at 480–83. 
 116  See supra note 102. 
 117  See Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 238 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013) (“The educational benefits recognized in Grutter go beyond the narrow 
‘pedagogical concept’ urged by Appellants.  On this understanding, there is no reason 
to assume that critical mass will or should be the same for every racial group or every 
university.”).  See also Harpalani, supra note 26, at 479–83 (discussing “[w]hy critical 
mass can vary for different minority groups[.]”). 
 118  When Fisher was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, the amicus brief of the Mountain 
States Legal Foundation  made a similar claim.  See Brief for Mountain States Legal 
Foundation as Amicus Curiae, at 14, Fisher v. Texas, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (“[B]ecause critical mass cannot be quantified, no court is able 
to determine whether a critical mass is present or lacking.”). 
 119  Cf. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (holding that there is no judicially 
manageable standard to assess partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts). 
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Justice Antonin Scalia quipped,  “[w]e should probably stop calling it 
critical mass . . . [and] . . . [c]all it a cloud or something like that.”120 
For these reasons, in spite of the prominence of “critical mass” at 
oral argument, the Fisher majority opinion did not define “critical 
mass” or rely on the concept in its ruling,121 and it did not posit any 
other external measure of diversity.  The Court merely deferred to 
universities to define their educational missions and related benefits 
of diversity, and it directed lower courts to stringently review whether 
race-conscious admissions policies were necessary to attain those 
benefits.122  Consideration of Fisher on remand also did not shed any 
new light.  Judge Patrick Higginbotham’s opinion stated a 
characteristically obscure definition of critical mass: 
Critical mass, the tipping point of diversity, has no fixed 
upper bound of universal application, nor is it the minimum 
threshold at which minority students do not feel isolated or 
like spokespersons for their race.  Grutter defines critical mass 
by reference to a broader view of diversity . . . .123 
Predictably, Judge Emilio Garza, in dissent, critiqued UT for “fail[ing] 
to define [critical mass] in any objective manner,”124 noting that “[a]t 
best the University’s attempted articulations of ‘critical mass’ . . . are 
subjective, circular, or tautological.”125 
3.  “Critical Mass” After Fisher 
The important takeaway from Fisher is the Supreme Court 
opinion’s direct emphasis on the educational benefits of diversity, 
including “lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes”126 and  
 
 120  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 70–71.  The courtroom erupted 
in laughter after Justice Scalia made this statement. 
 121  The Fisher majority opinion only mentions the term “critical mass” twice.  One 
such reference is at the beginning of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion: “[UT] has 
committed itself to increasing racial minority enrollment on campus.  It refers to this 
goal as a ‘critical mass.’”  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).  The other 
reference just notes that UT concluded that it “lacked a ‘critical mass’ of minority 
students and that to remedy the deficiency it was necessary to give explicit 
consideration to race in the undergraduate admissions program.”  Id. at 2416.  The 
other Fisher opinions do not mention “critical mass” at all.  In contrast, the Grutter 
majority opinion mentioned “critical mass” 15 times, and all of the Grutter opinions 
together mention “critical mass” 62 times.  See generally Grutter, 439 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 122  See supra notes 4–6. 
 123  Fisher, 758 F.3d at 656. 
 124  Id. at 661 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
 125  Id. at 667 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
 126  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 308 (2003) 
(holding that “substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity 
is designed to produce, include[e] cross-racial understanding and the breaking down 
HARPALANI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:18 PM 
788 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:761 
“enabl[ing] [students] to better understand persons of different 
races[,]”127 rather than on a definition of critical mass.  These 
educational benefits, not “critical mass” itself, are the key, as 
universities can draw from them in defining their educational 
missions.128  Creating an operational definition of critical mass, 
including metrics to measure educational benefits and racial isolation, 
can be a useful part of this process129 —but not to serve as a precise end 
point for narrow tailoring purposes.  This Article thus argues that 
critical mass is merely a part of the compelling interest in diversity, not 
part of the narrow tailoring test for race-conscious admissions 
policies.130 
II. HOLISTIC ADMISSIONS AND RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS 
In addition to articulating the educational benefits of racial 
diversity as a compelling state interest, Grutter also laid out narrow 
tailoring principles for race-conscious admissions policies, and Fisher 
reaffirmed these.131  Grutter held that “truly individualized 
consideration demands that race be used in a flexible, nonmechanical 
way.”132  The requirements for individualized review133and for flexible 
use of race in conjunction with other factors134 are the hallmark of a 
 
of racial stereotypes”). 
 127  Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 330. 
 128  See infra Part III. 
 129  See supra notes 102, 108. 
 130  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 485 (“[C]ritical mass . . . is merely part of the 
definition of Grutter’s compelling interest, not part of the narrow tailoring test for 
race-conscious admissions policies.”).  In its Fifth Circuit brief on remand, UT made a 
similar argument.  See Brief for Appellees, at 45, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 09-
50822). (“Fisher . . . specifically—and correctly—framed her critical mass arguments 
as compelling interest arguments.”).  But see Boddie, supra note 112, at 817-18 (suggesting 
that critical mass could be a narrow tailoring test for a given admissions cycle). 
 131  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (“[I]t remains at all times the University’s obligation to 
demonstrate, and the Judiciary’s obligation to determine, that admissions processes 
‘ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes 
an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.’”) 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 
 132  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 133  Id. at 336–37. (“When using race as a “plus” factor in university admissions, a 
university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race 
or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.  The importance of this 
individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious admissions program is 
paramount.”) (citing Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
318 n.52 (1978) (identifying the “denial . . . of th[e] right to individualized 
consideration” as the “principal evil” of the medical school’s admissions program.)). 
 134  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“[T]he Law School engages in a highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious consideration to all the ways an 
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constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions policy: these 
features distinguished the Grutter plan from the automatic point system 
struck down in Gratz v. Bollinger.135 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s embrace of the University of 
Michigan Law School’s holistic admissions plan in Grutter,136 coupled 
with its rejection of the University’s undergraduate point system in 
Gratz v. Bollinger,137 illustrates the relationship between race-conscious 
policies and the tangible, educational benefits of racial diversity.  
Grutter’s requirement for individualized, flexible consideration of race 
also goes hand in hand with its notion of “critical mass,” because unlike 
an automatic point system, such individualized, flexible review 
facilitates the admission of a “variety of viewpoints”138 within racial 
groups.139 
This Article, however, argues that these very requirements for 
individualized review and flexible consideration of race are in tension 
with Grutter’s other narrow tailoring principles: (1) preference for race-
neutral alternatives;140 and (2) gradual phase-out of race-conscious 
admissions policies,141 both of which were reinforced even more 
 
applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment . . . [u]nlike the 
program at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger . . . the Law School awards no mechanical, 
predetermined diversity ‘bonuses’ based on race or ethnicity.”). 
 135  Id.  See also supra notes 24–25. 
 136  See supra note 24. 
 137  Id. 
 138  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 139  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 494–95 (discussing how Grutter’s narrow 
tailoring principles facilitate diversity within racial groups in an admitted class). 
 140  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (“Narrow tailoring does . . . require serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the 
university seeks.”). 
 141  Id. at 342 (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time . . . 
[i]n the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met by sunset 
provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to determine 
whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”).  
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion also stated: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to 
further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public 
higher education.  Since that time, the number of minority applicants 
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased.  We expect that 
25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today.   
Id. at 343. 
In the aftermath of Grutter, there was much scholarly debate on whether the 25 year 
period constituted a binding time limit on race-conscious admissions policies.  See, e.g., 
Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of our Democratic 
Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 201 (2003) (arguing that the Grutter majority opinion 
warns universities to phase out race-conscious admissions policies within 25 years or 
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strongly in Fisher.142  First, even if they can attain similar numbers of 
minority students, race-neutral alternatives do not allow the nuanced 
consideration of race that the diversity interest entails.  Bakke, Grutter, 
and Fisher all proclaimed that the “state interest that would justify 
consideration of race or ethnic background  . . . is not an interest in 
simple ethnic diversity” that is served when “a specified percentage of 
the student body . . . [is] members of selected ethnic groups[.]”143  
Second, even if race-neutral alternatives could somehow achieve 
nuanced racial diversity beyond the numbers, it is still exceedingly 
difficult to eliminate race from a holistic admissions process with 
individualized review.144  Third, universities are already placing a de 
facto limit on race-conscious admissions, based on their academic 
selectivity.  Most universities would like more racial diversity, but they 
are only willing to compromise their academic selectivity to a certain 
extent. 
 
have courts invalidate them); Boyce F. Martin Jr., Fifty Years Later, It’s Time to Mend 
Brown’s Broken Promise, U. ILL. L. REV. 1203, 1219 (2004) (arguing that Grutter’s 25 year 
prediction for end of race-conscious admissions was aspirational rather than binding.); 
Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of 
Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 83 (2006) (arguing that “the twenty-
five year expectation is problematic to the extent that it is understood as imposing a 
definite endpoint”).  But see Sheryl G. Snyder, A Comment on the Litigation Strategy, 
Judicial Politics and Political Context which Produced Grutter and Gratz, 92 KY. L.J. 241, 260 
(2004) (viewing Grutter’s 25 year prediction as a binding end point for race-conscious 
admissions).  Nevertheless, both parties in Fisher agreed that the 25-year period was 
not a binding time limit.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 11 
(Plaintiff’s counsel Bert Rein answering “No, I don’t” to Justice Scalia’s question, “do 
you think that Grutter held that there is no more affirmative action in higher education 
after 2028?”); Id. at 50 (UT counsel Gregory Garre noting that “we don’t read Grutter 
as establishing that kind of time clock.”).  At the Fisher oral argument, Justices Antonin 
Scalia and Stephen Breyer at least hinted that the 25 year period was legally significant.  
Id. at 49 (Justice Scalia stating that Grutter  “holds for . . . only . . . sixteen more 
years[.]”); Id. at 8 (Justice Breyer noting that “Grutter said it would be good law for at 
least 25 years[.]”).  Later in oral arguments, Justice Breyer stated that he “agree[d] it 
might” be the holding of Grutter that there can be no race-conscious admissions 
policies after 2028.  Id. at 11.  However, Justice O’Connor also later suggested that 25 
years was not a binding time limit on race-conscious admissions.  See Sandra Day 
O’Connor & Stewart J. Schwab, Affirmative Action in Higher Education over the Next 
Twenty-Five Years: A Need for Study and Action, in THE NEXT 25 YEARS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
IN HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA 58 (David L. 
Featherman, Martin Hall & Marvin Krislov eds., 2010) (“[T]hat 25-year expectation is, 
of course, far from binding on any justices who may be responsible for entertaining a 
challenge to an affirmative-action program in 2028.”). 
 142  See supra text accompanying notes 4–6. 
 143  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978); 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324; Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013). 
 144  See infra Part II.C.2.  See also Harpalani, supra note 49, at 69–72. 
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A. Individualized Review and Race-Neutral Alternatives 
Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher all stated that the compelling interest in 
diversity “encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.”145  Race can only be used “as one of many ‘plus 
factors’” to determine “the overall individual contribution of each 
candidate.”146  Holistic, individualized review is thus necessary 
thoroughly consider all of the contributions of each applicant, not just 
race. 
Percentage plans such as Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law 
compromise this feature by automatically admitting applicants, based 
on high school rank, without any further review of their applications.  
Grutter explicitly rejected percentage plans as adequate race-neutral 
alternatives because: 
even assuming such plans are race-neutral, they may 
preclude the university from conducting the individualized 
assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is not 
just racially diverse, but diverse along all the qualities valued 
by the university.147 
Fisher did not abrograte or even address this aspect of Grutter.  It merely 
remanded the suit  for more stringent review, and on remand the Fifth 
Circuit upheld UT’s plan, noting: 
Race-conscious holistic review is necessary to make the Top 
Ten Percent Plan workable by patching the holes that a 
mechanical admissions program leaves in its ability to 
achieve the rich diversity that contributes to its academic 
mission. . . . [A] limited use of race is necessary to target 
minorities with unique talents and higher test scores to 
add . . . diversity . . . to the student body.148 
But even if the remand ruling had found the Top Ten Percent Law to 
be an adequate race-neutral alternative, it would not have any judicial 
impact beyond Texas.  The Texas legislature compelled UT to adopt 
such the Top Ten Percent Law plan, but there is no authority to 
 
 145  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
315 (Powell, J., concurring)). 
 146  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 147  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.  The Grutter majority also questioned how percentage 
plans could work for admission to graduate and professional schools.  Id. (noting 
failure to explain how “‘percentage plans,’ recently adopted by public undergraduate 
institutions in Texas, Florida, and California, to guarantee admission to all students 
above a certain class-rank threshold in every high school in the State . . . could work 
for graduate and professional schools.”). 
 148  Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657. 
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suggest that courts—as opposed to state legislatures—can compel 
public universities to adopt such percentage plans: Grutter suggests 
precisely the opposite.149 
For similar reasons, the Grutter majority also rejected lottery 
admissions plans, which would randomly admit applicants from a pool,  
even if they could achieve sufficient racial diversity—because they 
“would make . . . nuanced judgment impossible . . . [and] . . .would 
effectively sacrifice all other educational values, not to mention 
every . . . kind of diversity” other than representation of racial groups.150  
Similarly, Grutter stated that “lower admission standards for all 
students” would be a “drastic remedy” and would “sacrifice a vital 
component of . . . [a school’s] educational mission.”151 
Individualized review thus facilitates aspects of the compelling 
interest in diversity152 and related educational values that are precluded 
by many race-neutral alternatives, even if those alternatives can admit 
sufficient numbers of minority students.  Perhaps even more 
significantly, the educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter 
and Fisher necessitate not only individualized review of applicants, but 
also flexible, individualized consideration of race itself. 
B. Flexible, Individualized Consideration of Race 
In addition to individualized review generally, Grutter specifically 
highlighted flexible, individualized consideration of race.  The main 
feature that distinguished the Grutter plan from the one struck down 
in Gratz was that the University of Michigan Law School considered 
race in a flexible, individualized manner—differently for each 
applicant—rather than in the mechanical fashion of the 
undergraduate admissions policy, where exactly the same number of 
points were awarded to all minority applicants.  The Grutter court 
further underscored this point when it noted that the compelling 
interest in diversity included “breaking down racial stereotypes” and 
 
 149  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 150  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. 
 151  Id.  But see id. at 367–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
( “[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to 
‘predict’ academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every 
applicant a chance to . . . succeed[.] . . . [T]he entire [admissions] process is poisoned 
by numerous exceptions to ‘merit.’ . . . [T]here is nothing ancient, honorable, or 
constitutionally protected about ‘selective’ admissions.”). 
 152  Id. at 337 (“[The] importance of . . . individualized consideration in the context 
of a race-conscious admissions program is paramount. . . . [A] highly individualized, 
holistic review of each applicant’s file . . .  giv[es] serious consideration to all the ways 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment.”). 
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having a “variety of viewpoints” within each racial group.153  Universities 
can only pursue this variety of perspectives through flexible, 
individualized review of applicants, based on the discretion of 
admissions officers.154 
At the Fisher oral argument, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, 
arguing in support of UT’s policy, underscored these specific 
educational benefits noted in Grutter: 
Universities . . . are looking . . . to make individualized 
decisions about applicants who will directly further the 
education mission . . . [f]or example, they will look for 
individuals who will play against racial stereotypes . . . [t]he 
African American fencer; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered 
classical Greek.155 
The Supreme Court’s Fisher opinion described the compelling interest 
in diversity in terms of “lessening . . . racial stereotypes” and also 
deferred to universities on their educational missions, which can 
readily incorporate this goal.156  Under Grutter and Fisher, so long as 
universities can provide a “reasoned, principled explanation” for 
seeking to admit individuals who defy racial stereotypes, courts should 
defer to  the universities’ judgment and allow them to use race-
 
 153  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because nonminority students 
learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather a variety of viewpoints among minority 
students.”).  See also Harpalani, supra note 26, at 477 (arguing that “critical mass refers 
to a sufficiently diverse group of perspectives within each racial group to actualize the 
educational benefits of diversity”). 
 154  See Carbado, supra note 44, at 1156 (“[I]ndvidualized review enables 
[discretion] . . . admissions officials have significant leeway to make  . . . choices 
between and among students within the same racial group.”).  Professor Carbado also 
discusses various criteria that admissions officers could use to make such choices.  Id. 
at 1147–58. 
 155  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 60.  See also Carbado, supra note 
44, at 1181 (“Solicitor General Verrilli’s response to Justice Alito highlights how the 
University of Texas might have made intraracial diversity a more central concern in 
the litigation.”).  This Article deals more with intraracial diversity in Part III.B, infra. 
 156  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“According to Grutter, a 
university’s ‘educational judgment that . . . diversity is essential to its educational 
mission is one to which we defer.’  Grutter concluded that the decision to pursue ‘the 
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,’ . . . that the University 
deems integral to its mission is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which 
some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper under Grutter.  A court, of course, 
should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic 
decision.  On this point, the District Court and Court of Appeals were correct in 
finding that Grutter calls for deference to the University’s conclusion, ‘“based on its 
experience and expertise,”’ . . . that a diverse student body would serve its educational 
goals.”). 
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conscious admissions policies, as necessary, to achieve this goal.157  
Grutter and Fisher both already provide such a “reasoned, principled 
explanation.”158  Thus, Solicitor General Verrilli’s argument ties 
together the compelling interest (breaking down racial stereotypes) 
and narrow tailoring (flexible, individualized consideration of race) 
prongs of Grutter and Fisher.  Such a linkage is the hallmark of a 
constitutionally viable race-conscious admissions policy. 
Moreover, there is no race-neutral alternative that will allow 
identification of African American fencers or other individuals who 
explicitly defy racial stereotypes; by definition, any admissions policy 
that seeks to do so will have to consider race.  Proxy measures such as 
socioeconomic status may be correlated with race, but standing alone, 
they will not allow universities to identify individuals who defy racial 
stereotypes.  Until racial stereotypes themselves no longer exist, race-
conscious policies will be needed to identify individuals who help 
break them down—and there is no reason to believe that racial 
stereotypes are going away any time soon.159 
Solicitor General Verrilli’s argument illustrates precisely why race-
conscious admissions policies remain viable after Fisher.  Courts might 
still inquire whether proxy measures, such as socioeconomic status, 
attendance at particular schools, family characteristics, or geographic 
criteria, might serve to produce sufficient racial diversity within 
student bodies.  Unlike percentage plans and lotteries, using these 
measures does not compromise individualized review of applicants: in 
fact, universities already include these measures by universities in the 
individualized assessment of diversity, as potential “plus” factors in 
addition to race.160  Whether use of these non-racial factors alone would 
produce sufficient numerical racial diversity is an empirical question: 
 
 157  Id. 
 158  See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
 159  See Vinay Harpalani, Racial Stereotypes and Achievement-Linked Identity 
Formation during Adolescence: An Investigation of Athletic Investment and Academic 
Resilience 1–26 (Aug. 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania) (on file with Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania) (noting 
continuing prevalence and salience of racial stereotypes—particularly of stereotypes 
of Black Americans related to intelligence and athletic abilities); BRUCE EVAN BLAINE, 
UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIVERSITY 87 (2013) (“[T]hinking about other 
people in terms of their race is unavoidable.”). 
 160  See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
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studies suggest that it would not,161 although this may vary by locality.162  
Nevertheless, even if these non-racial factors did by themselves 
significantly increase the numbers of minority students, they would still 
not fully serve the compelling interest in diversity articulated in Grutter 
and Fisher.163  Using such proxy measures may allow universities to rely 
 
 161  See, e.g., THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE & ALEXANDRIA WALTON RADFORD, NO LONGER 
SEPARATE, NOT YET EQUAL: RACE AND CLASS IN ELITE COLLEGE ADMISSION AND CAMPUS 
LIFE 356 (2009) (“Without a doubt, class-based preferences cannot achieve the same 
ends as racial affirmative action.”); Thomas J. Kane, Race and Ethnic Preferences in College 
Admissions, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 448 (Christopher Jencks & 
Meredith Phillips eds.) (1998) (“[C]lass is a very poor substitute for race for selective 
colleges seeking racial diversity.”); Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, 
Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA’S 
UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 153 (Richard 
D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004) (“[I]ncome-based policies are not an effective substitute for 
conscious racial and ethnic enrollment targets.”); Julie J. Park, Nida Denson and 
Nicholas A. Bowman, Does Socioeconomic Diversity Make a Difference? Examining the Effects 
of Racial and Socioeconomic Diversity on the Campus Climate for Diversity, 50 AM. EDUC. 
RESEARCH J. 466, 467 (2013) (finding “that both socioeconomic and racial diversity are 
essential to promoting a positive campus racial climate and that racial and 
socioeconomic diversity, while interrelated, are not interchangeable.”).  See also 
sources cited supra note 102. 
 162  See Kahlenberg, supra note 20, at 26–61 (discussing impact of state university 
bans on race-conscious admissions policies on minority student enrollment).  Mr. 
Kahlenberg finds that through a combination of recruitment and use of 
socioeconomic criteria and proxies for race as admissions factors, universities in 
Washington, Florida, Georgia, and Nebraska have been able to recover to prior levels 
of Black and Latina/o enrollment, after experiencing initial drops in minority 
enrollment after bans on race-conscious admissions.  However, it is unclear how much 
this recovery is due to demographic changes in the states (particularly the growing 
Latina/o populations), rather than the efficacy of race-neutral alternatives.  
Additionally, state universities in Washington and Nebraska had low numbers of Black 
and Latina/o students even before enacting their bans (owing to the low percentage 
of minorities in the state population overall).  Recovery using recruitment and race-
neutral factors in those states did not require much, and these universities may never 
have approached a “critical mass” of minority students to begin with.  Even Justice 
Scalia agreed that regardless of a state’s demographics, a very low percentage of 
minority students on campus does not constitute a critical mass.  See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 47, at 15 (Justice Scalia stating “Why don’t you seriously suggest 
that demographic—that the demographic makeup of the state has nothing to do with 
whether somebody feels isolated, that if you’re in a state that is only 1 percent black 
that doesn’t mean that you’re not isolated, so long as there’s 1 percent in the class? . . . 
I wish you would take that position because it seems, to me, right.”).  Moreover, in 15 
years, the flagship public universities in California (UC Berkeley and UCLA) have not 
recovered to the levels of minority enrollment that they had before California’s ban 
on race-conscious admissions, in spite of a significant increase in the minority 
population of California.  See Kahlenberg, supra note 20 at 36, 38.  Also, it appears that 
proscription of race-conscious admissions policies may have a larger impact on more 
elite universities that draw a national student body.  See ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra 
note 161, at 464–65 (private institutions) and 480–81 (public institutions). 
 163  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (noting that compelling interest is “not an interest 
in simple ethnic diversity . . . [but rather] . . . encompasses a far broader array of 
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less on race, but for specific and nuanced identification of individuals 
who defy racial stereotypes, it is—by definition—also necessary to 
consider race itself. 
C. What Does “Race-Neutral” Mean in an Admissions Process? 
Holistic admissions policies implicate other questions that relate 
to the very legal definitions of race-consciousness and race-neutrality.  
The Fisher Plaintiffs raised one such issue with their claim that race was 
too small of an admissions factor at UT to serve the diversity interest.  
A related issue—one that courts will likely have to deal with—is 
whether race can ever be completely removed from a holistic 
admissions plan.  Both of these issues speak to the importance of race-
consciousness. 
1. Can Race Be Too Small of A Factor to Serve the Diversity 
Interest? 
In Fisher, the Plaintiffs actually claimed that race had “an 
infinitesimal impact” on UT admissions:164 too small to be 
constitutional because it did not contribute enough to the educational 
benefits of diversity.165  The Plaintiffs argued “UT is unable to identify 
any students who were ‘ultimately offered admission due to their race 
who would not have otherwise been offered admission.’”166  Similarly, 
in his Fisher remand dissent, Judge Garza contended that “[i]f race is 
indeed without discernible impact, the University cannot carry its 
 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.”). 
 164  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 10, at 38–39 (arguing that “admissions 
statistics confirm that [UT’s] decision to classify . . . applicants by race has ‘had an 
infinitesimal impact on critical mass in the student body as a whole.’”). 
 165  Id. (arguing that “where racial classifications have only a ‘minimal impact’ in 
pursuing a compelling interest, it ‘casts doubt on the necessity of using racial 
classifications’ in the first instance . . . [.]”) (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007)).  See also Ayres & Foster, supra note 
72, at 517, 523 n.27 (“At least as a theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not 
only that preferences not be too large, but also that they not be too small so as to fail 
to achieve the goals of the relevant compelling government interest.”).  Justice 
Kennedy asked Plaintiff’s counsel, Bert Rein, “[W]hat’s the problem” with the 
“University’s race-conscious admission plan . . . [admitting] . . . so few minorities” and 
noting that he “had  trouble with that [argument] reading the brief.”  See Transcript 
of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 22.  Justice Kennedy then answered his own 
question by suggesting that UT “shouldn’t impose this hurt or injury [of using race] . . . 
for so little benefit[,]” and Mr. Rein agreed.  Id. at 23. 
 166  See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 10, at 38–39. But see Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 47, at 64 (Chief Justice Roberts asking the Solicitor General if 
he “agree[s] that [race] makes a difference in some cases[,]” to which the Solicitor 
General responded “[y]es, it does.”). 
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burden of proving that race-conscious holistic review is necessary to 
achieving . . . diversity.”167 
Throughout the Fisher litigation, there has been a dispute 
(ultimately unresolved) about whether UT’s race-conscious policy 
actually led to the admission of any minority students who would not 
have been admitted absent the use of race.168  In any case, however, 
there are flaws with the Fisher Plaintiffs’ arguments and Judge Garza’s 
contention. 
First, Grutter does not state that a race-conscious policy can be too 
small to be constitutional, and it actually implies the opposite.  Under 
Grutter, universities should gradually phase out race-conscious policies 
and use race-neutral alternatives “as they develop.”169  Justice O’Connor 
and the majority understood that such a gradual process would be 
necessary, as universities cannot eliminate race-conscious policies all at 
once, when some magic “critical mass” is obtained.170  A logical 
 
 167  Fisher, 758 F.3d at 672 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
 168  See also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of 
Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. 113, 115 (2012) (“Fisher does not 
claim that racial consideration . . . necessarily doomed her prospects.  No evidence 
supports that position.  The record shows that a total of 216 black and Latino 
applicants gained acceptance to UT through holistic review in 2008, when Fisher 
unsuccessfully applied to UT.  The plaintiff concedes that race played no role in the 
admission of 183 of those 216 students . . . [t]he record is inconclusive on whether 
[the remaining] thirty-three black and Latino students benefitted from race.”).  But see 
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2431 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In the University’s entering class of 
2009 False . . among the students admitted outside the Top Ten Percent plan, blacks 
scored at the 52d percentile of 2009 SAT takers nationwide, while Asians scored at the 
93d percentile . . . . Blacks had a mean GPA of 2.57 and a mean SAT score of 1524; 
Hispanics had a mean GPA of 2.83 and a mean SAT score of 1794; whites had a mean 
GPA of 3.04 and a mean SAT score of 1914; and Asians had a mean GPA of 3.07 and a 
mean SAT score of 1991.”).  Nevertheless, even the Fisher Plaintiffs contended that 
these disparities did not necessarily make a difference in the admission of any students.  
The data cited by Justice Thomas combined both the race-neutral (Academic Index) 
and race-conscious (Personal Academic Index) components of UT’s holistic 
admissions policy.  See supra Part II.A.3.  Moreover, similar academic disparities existed 
for students admitted via the race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law.  For the UT entering 
class of 2009, among students automatically admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law, 
White students (n=2508) had a mean SAT score of 1864; African American students 
(n=297) had a mean SAT score of 1584; Asian American students (n=1101) had a mean 
SAT score of 1874; and Hispanic students (n=1256) had a mean SAT score of 1628.  
UNIV. OF TEX. OFF. OF ADMISSIONS, IMPLEMENT. AND RESULTS OF TEX. AUT. ADMISSIONS 
LAW, (HB 588) AT UNIV. OF TEXAS, SEC. 1: DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF ENTERING 
FRESHMEN, FALL 2010, at 14 tbl. 7, http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/ 
research/HB588-Report13.pdf [hereinafter UT Results of Automatic Admissions Law 
Report]. 
 169  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (“Universities . . . can and should 
draw on the most promising aspects of . . . race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”). 
 170  See supra notes 108–112 and accompanying text. 
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consequence of this is that at some point, a university’s use of race will 
be very small but still be constitutional.171 
Second, Grutter actually contemplated that admission of small 
numbers of applicants who defy racial stereotypes would facilitate the 
educational benefits of diversity; Solicitor General Verrilli articulated 
this stance at the Fisher oral argument.172  Additionally, a small number 
of minority students can meaningfully impact diversity on campus.  
They may form student organizations and sponsor events related to 
diversity, or they may increase representation in majors and programs 
where minority students are especially underrepresented.173  In fact, 
the whole point of a holistic admissions policy with individualized 
review is to identify applicants who will have a significant individual 
impact on the educational benefits of diversity.174  Grutter and Fisher’s 
very emphasis on individualized consideration175 underscores the 
notion that even one individual can contribute significantly to the 
educational environment of a university. 
Third, even if courts read the diversity interest more narrowly, 
there are other practical problems with the Fisher Plaintiffs’ contention 
that a race-conscious admissions policy can have too small of an 
impact.  Absent a university’s admission that it uses race or some other 
conclusive evidence, it is the impact of race that ultimately must be 
detected to enforce any proscription on the use of race.176  If the impact 
 
 171  Universities will approach this point when there is reduction in disparities 
between minority and non-minority applicants on grades and standardized test scores.  
Cf. infra Part II.D.2. 
 172  See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 173  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 532–33 (“It is possible that a race-conscious 
policy that admits only a small number of minority students can have a meaningful, 
unique impact if those students add to the diversity of viewpoints and experiences in 
a manner beyond the race-neutral policy.  The admission of even small numbers of 
African American and Latina/o students from certain majors, or from more 
competitive schools, would be justifiable if minority students in those majors were not 
admitted sufficiently via [Texas’s] Top Ten Percent Law, as would the admission of 
small numbers of Native American students via a race-conscious admissions policy.”). 
 174  See supra notes 155–163 and accompanying text. 
 175  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (noting that to use race-conscious 
policies “a university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual . . .”); Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 
(“[A] race-conscious admissions program . . . must . . . ‘ensure that each applicant is 
evaluated as an individual . . .’”) (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337)). 
 176  See Sander & Taylor, supra note 81, at 158 (contending that after Proposition 
209 (California’s constitutional ban on race-conscious policies) was passed in 1996, 
faculty in University of California system “spoke of the feasibility of evasion” for “small 
programs,” where “[t]he number of students was so small, and the criteria for selection 
so subjective, that outside investigators could not easily detect racial discrimination.”).  
Professors Sander and Taylor also note that “[f]or larger programs, such as law schools 
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is too small to be detected, then there can be no enforcement of such 
a proscription: it makes no sense to “smoke out” statistically negligible 
use of race.  This leads to another important question about holistic 
admissions plans: can race ever be completely removed? 
2. Can Race be Completely Removed From a Holistic 
Admissions Plan? 
Even if the Supreme Court proscribed race-conscious policies, by 
overturning Grutter, would race be eliminated from the admissions 
process?  Consider another “race-neutral” alternative that universities 
might use: personal statements and diversity essays, rather than the 
separate and explicit consideration of race on applications.  In 
practice, this would mean that applicants would no longer check a box 
that identifies their racial background—or at least that information 
from any such checked box is not used in the admissions process.  Such 
an admissions policy is holistic and Grutter-like in every way, except that 
there is no explicit consideration of race as a “plus” factor.177 
Applicants, however, could articulate their potential 
contributions to diversity, including their racial backgrounds, in a 
separate essay or personal statement.  Holistic admissions policies 
typically involve such essays and personal statements, regardless of 
whether race is an explicit admissions factor.  At the Fisher oral 
argument, Chief Justice Roberts noted the fact that “race is the only 
one of [UT’s] holistic factors that appears on the cover of every 
application.”178  But even if race did not “appear on the cover of every 
application,” it may be discerned in other ways.  An applicant’s 
personal statement and essays, along with references to student group 
membership (in groups such as the Black Student League), may 
provide strong cues that signal the applicant’s racial background.  
Basic information such as the applicant’s school or place of residence, 
or just the applicant’s name, 179 could also be highly correlated with 
 
or business schools, that would obviously be more difficult.”  Id. 
 177  UT’s supplemental holistic admissions policy operated in this manner between 
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) and the 
abrogation of Hopwood by Grutter.  See Fisher, 758 F.3d at 645 (“The legislature adopted 
a Top Ten Percent Plan that left a substantial number of seats to a complementary 
holistic review process. Foreshadowing Grutter, admission supplementing the Top Ten 
Percent Plan included factors such as socio-economic diversity and family educational 
achievements but, controlled by Hopwood, it did not include race. In short, a holistic 
process sans race controlled the gate for the large percent of applicants not entering 
through the Top Ten Percent Plan.”). 
 178  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 54. 
 179  See Roland G. Fryer & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively 
Black Names, 119 Q. J. ECON. 767 (2004); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) 
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racial group membership. 
Consequently, as Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has warned, even if 
admissions committees are forbidden from considering race as 
discerned through these criteria, they may do so surreptitiously—
”resort[ing] to camouflage.”180  Admissions reviewers can use all of the 
application components mentioned above to discern racial 
information and admit more minority applicants through “winks, 
nods, and disguises.”181  A holistic admissions plan inherently considers 
race, even if there is no explicit “plus” factor allowed,182 because race 
can come into play through other holistic factors that are considered. 
Thus, even if the Supreme Court banned the use of race as a plus 
factor, admissions committees could still access and use information 
about applicants’ racial background.  Statistical evidence might 
establish large scale use of race-conscious policies: in both Bakke and 
Grutter, the Plaintiffs submitted such evidence of disparities in grades 
and test scores between admitted minority and non-minority 
students.183  But no such evidence was presented in Fisher; as noted 
 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that without affirmative action, “applicants may 
highlight . . . Hispanic surnames . . .”). 
 180  Fisher, 133 S. Ct at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As for holistic review, if 
universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many may ‘resort to camouflage’ 
to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”). 
 181  See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304–05 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One can reasonably 
anticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority 
enrollment . . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of 
affirmative action plans. . . . Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher 
education may resort to camouflage.  For example, schools may encourage applicants 
to write of their cultural traditions in the essays they submit, or to indicate whether 
English is their second language. Seeking to improve their chances for admission, 
applicants may highlight the minority group associations to which they belong, or the 
Hispanic surnames of their mothers or grandparents.  In turn, teachers’ 
recommendations may emphasize who a student is as much as what he or she has 
accomplished[.] . . . If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately 
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving 
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”).   
See also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal protection cannot become 
an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.”). 
 182  Cf. Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 CAL. L. 
REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (exploring unconscious racial biases in admissions and raising 
“the question of whether race can in fact be eliminated from admissions processes”); 
Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as 
Diversity Management At UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
985, 1015 (2007) (“[T]he line between race-based and race-blind policy making can 
be quite blurry.”). 
 183  See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 n.7 (1978) 
(comparing Plaintiff Alan Bakke’s GPA and MCAT scores with those of all admitted 
applicants and those admitted via the special admissions program); see Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2001), overruled by Grutter v. Bollinger, 
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above, the Plaintiffs themselves claimed that UT’s use of race was too 
insignificant to be constitutional or even detectable.184  Absent such 
statistical evidence, it is difficult whether a given holistic admissions 
plan uses race.185 
This is why Fisher itself was largely a “fishing expedition.”186  Even 
if the Supreme Court had struck down UT’s use of race, individual 
reviewers may still be aware of applicants’ racial background, and 
would be able to use this information.187  It is quite likely that at least 
some individual reviewers would desire to an increase in racial diversity 
in the undergraduate student body, and would use available 
information to do so.188  Thus, race could still be a factor in UT 
 
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Plaintiffs’ expert witness concluding that “that ‘[a]ll the graphs 
comparing Native American, African American, Mexican American, and Puerto Rican 
applicants to Caucasian American applicants show wide separation indicating a much 
higher probability of acceptance for the particular ethnic group at a given selection 
index value’”).  But see Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic 
of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1049 (2002) (cited in Gratz, 539 U.S. at 
303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In any admissions process where applicants greatly 
outnumber admittees, and where white applicants greatly outnumber minority 
applicants, substantial preferences for minority applicants will not significantly 
diminish the odds of admission facing white applicants.”). 
 184  See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 185  This point came up in oral arguments when Justice Scalia asked Solicitor 
General Donald Verrilli that if two applicants “are identical in all other respects . . . 
what does the racial preference mean if it doesn’t mean that in that situation the 
minority applicant wins and the other applicant loses?”  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 47, at 62–63.  Mr. Verrilli responded that “[t]here may not be a racial 
preference in that situation.  It’s going to depend on a holistic, individualized 
consideration of the applicant.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy seemed dismayed, stating that he 
“thought that the whole point is that sometimes race should be a tie-breaker . . . 
[and]. . . if it isn’t . . .then we should just say you can’t use race . . .”  Id.  Mr. Verrilli 
responded that “[race] functions more subtly than that[.]”  Id. 
 186  See Harpalani, supra note 49, at 73 (arguing that “[t]he entire Fisher case may 
just be a fishing expedition[.]”). 
 187  See text accompanying supra notes 178–182. 
 188  One might call this endeavor “The Underground Railroad to Elite Universities” 
to capture the moral suasion of ardent proponents of affirmative action.  Given the 
long history of segregation and denial of educational opportunity to African 
Americans, a reduction in Black enrollment at selective universities would likely 
inspire subversive measures analogous to the Underground Railroad during the era of 
American slavery.  See Underground Railroad, HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/underground-railroad (last visited Apr. 
2, 2015).  In fact, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and 
Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary (BAMN) draws a 
similar parallel between affirmative action and the abolitionist movement by naming 
its online journal “Liberator.”  See About BAMN, BAMN.COM, http://www.bamn.com/ 
about-bamn (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).  This name derives from The Liberator, which 
was a weekly abolitionist newspaper published by William Lloyd Garrison from 1831–
1865.  See The Liberator, ACCESSIBLE-ARCHIVES.COM, http://www.accessible-archives. 
com/collections/the-liberator/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
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admissions, even if it was not “on the cover of every application.”189 
In fact, accusations of “winks, nods, and disguises” have arisen in 
California, where the state constitution bans explicit consideration of 
race in public education and other public arenas.190  The University of 
California (UC) system still uses admissions essays and personal 
statements, where applicants can elaborate on their life experiences, 
contributions to diversity, and potentially identify their racial 
backgrounds.191  Two faculty members at the at the University of 
California at Los Angeles (UCLA), Professor Tim Groseclose (now of 
George Mason University)192 and Professor Richard Sander (of UCLA 
School of Law),193 have contended that UCLA’s holistic undergraduate 
admissions process is race-conscious, in defiance of California 
constitutional proscription on race-conscious policies.  Beginning in 
 
 189  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 54.  Of course, it may cost more 
for universities to review applications if race is not on the cover.  However, universities 
have adjusted to similar cost increases in the past.  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 532 
n.309 (“[C]olleges and universities have adjusted to similar circumstances in the past: 
after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on holistic admissions and 
eliminate more cost-effective point systems similar to the one struck down in Gratz.  See 
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“Respondents contend that ‘[t]he volume 
of applications and the presentation of applicant information make it impractical for 
[undergraduate admissions] to use the . . . admissions system’ upheld by the Court 
today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a program capable of 
providing individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does 
not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.”) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 190  CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant 
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, 
or public contracting.”). 
 191  See Freshman Applicant, BERKELEY.EDU, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/ 
freshman (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) and The Personal Statement, BERKELEY.EDU, 
http://admissions.berkeley.edu/personalstatement (last visited Apr. 2, 2015) 
(application and personal statement links for the University of California at Berkeley).  
Prompt #1 for freshman applicants is “[d]escribe the world you come from—for 
example, your family, community or school—and tell us how your world has shaped 
your dreams and aspirations.”  Id.  Applicants can readily allude to their racial 
background in response to this prompt, and members of underrepresented minority 
groups can self-identify here. 
 192  Tim Groseclose, Report on Suspected Malfeasance in UCLA Admissions and the 
Accompanying Cover-up (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/ 
faculty/groseclose/CUARS.Resignation.Report.pdf; see generally CHEATING: AN 
INSIDER’S REPORT ON THE USE OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS AT UCLA (2014). 
 193  Richard Sander, The Consideration of Race in UCLA Undergraduate Admissions 
(Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.seaphe.org/pdf/uclaadmissions.pdf; Sander & Taylor, 
supra note 81, at 169–70 (contending that as of 2012, “the University of California 
system is still, formally race-neutral, but in practice it has come very close to a form of 
racial proportionality . . . neither voters nor state officials can end university racial 
preferences by a single stroke”). 
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2008, Professors Groseclose and Sander accused admissions 
committee members of using applicant personal statements and other 
sources of information to identify race and advantage minority 
applicants (specifically African Americans).194  An independent review 
of undergraduate admissions by UCLA Sociology Professor Robert 
Mare found that: 
[s]ome disparities in outcomes that favor some groups and 
disfavor others among applicants who are otherwise similar 
on their measured characteristics. Whether these disparities 
are considered small or large is a normative, policy issue – 
not a scientific one.195 
UCLA concluded that “Mare’s report found no evidence of bias in 
UCLA’s admissions process[,]”196 that the differences reported by Mare 
“ar[ose] almost exclusively in supplemental review, a step . . . that is 
intended to give additional attention to atypical applicants[,]”197 and 
that “those . . . differences can be explained by the nuances and 
context of the applicant’s experience[.]”198 
Nevertheless, this type of controversy is quite likely to occur 
again—in California or any other state where race-conscious 
admissions policies are prohibited.199  Whether surreptitious use of race 
would be detectable and widespread enough to prompt litigation in a 
 
 194  See also Scott Jaschik, Is ‘Holistic Admissions’ a Cover for Helping Black Applicants?, 
INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/ 
09/02/ucla; Alexia Boyarsky, Findings By Law Professor Suggest That UCLA Admissions 
May Be Violating Prop 209, DAILY BRUIN (Oct. 23, 2012), http://dailybruin.com/ 
2012/10/23/findings-by-law-professor-suggest-that-ucla-admissions-may-be-violating-
prop-209/. 
 195  Robert D. Mare, Holistic Review in Freshman Admissions at UCLA, at 4 (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.senate.ucla.edu/committees/cuars/documents/UCLAReporton 
HolisticReviewinFreshmanAdmissions.pdf; see also id. at 3 (“Among otherwise 
equivalent applicants, Whites, African Americans, and Latinos are overrepresented 
among those admitted and Asian American applicants are underrepresented.”). 
 196  Ricardo Vazquez, Independent Report Confirms UCLA Admissions Process Working as 
Intended by Faculty, UCLA NEWSROOM (May 17, 2012), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/ 
stories/independent-report-confirms-ucla-234132. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Professors Groseclose and Sander were not the first to make accusations of 
racial bias in the UC system.  See Lipson, supra note 182, at 1015 (noting that former 
UC Board of Regents member and noted race-conscious admissions opponent “Ward 
Connerly . . . put forth and later partially retracted accusations that the admissions 
officials at UC-Berkeley were ‘slipping’ race in through the back door via individual 
assessment (e.g., by preferring applicants from school districts that are predominantly 
African American or Hispanic, by preferring applicants with names that are 
predominantly African American or Hispanic, and/or by preferring applicants who 
identify or give clues that they are African American or Hispanic in their personal 
statements).”). 
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post-Grutter regime is an open question.200  But if so, it would be even 
messier than litigation under Grutter.  Universities would not admit to 
intentionally using race in admissions—as they did in Bakke, Hopwood, 
Gratz, Grutter, and Fisher—because doing would be an explicit 
acknowledgement  that they committed a constitutional violation.  
Universities may not even be aware when individual reviewers use race 
or to what extent this occurs.  They may deliberately ignore the 
practice or even covertly encourage it. 
The only way to detect large scale use of race in such a “race-
neutral” admissions plan is to conduct statistical analysis of academic 
disparities between applicants of different racial backgrounds.  But 
even then, lack of intent would pose a well-known conundrum for 
equal protection doctrine.  Violations of the Equal Protection Clause 
require proof of the intentional use of race; policies that merely have 
a disparate impact by race do not violate the Constitution.201  Plaintiffs 
would thus have a much higher burden in any post-Grutter litigation: 
they would have to prove intentional use of race by the university.  This 
would probably mean establishing that academic disparities between 
minority and non-minority applicants are “unexplainable on grounds 
other than race.”202 
 
 
 200  In his Grutter dissent, Justice Scalia contended that Grutter would invite more 
litigation.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Unlike a clear constitutional holding that racial preferences in state educational 
institutions are impermissible, or even a clear anticonstitutional holding that racial 
preferences in state educational institutions are OK, today’s Grutter-Gratz split double 
header seems perversely designed to prolong the controversy and the litigation.”).  
While he may have been correct, Justice Scalia’s assertion that striking down race-
conscious policies would end litigation is yet untested.  If the controversies in the UC 
system are any indication, the controversy will go on even if the Supreme Court held 
race-conscious admissions to be unconstitutional. 
 201  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has “not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within 
the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause 
simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.”); Pers. 
Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, at 279 (1979) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause protects only against discrimination that occurs “because of, not 
merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). 
 202  Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977) 
(“Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from 
the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on 
its face.”).  See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding equal protection 
violation where permits to operate laundry businesses in wooden building were denied 
to all 200 Chinese immigrants and granted to nearly all non-Chinese applicants).  The 
question would then become what constitutes a “clear pattern.”  As the controversy in 
the UC system indicates, use of race in a holistic admissions process can be far from 
clear.  See supra notes 192–199 and accompanying text. 
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In the context of a holistic admissions policy that incorporates 
socioeconomic status, personal hardship, and other factors that 
correlate with race, and are often unquantified and not explicitly 
weighted, this would be a difficult inquiry.  Minority student 
enrollments would certainly drop if race-conscious admissions became 
unconstitutional,203 and universities would look to increase them by all 
other means possible.  As Justice Souter warned, equal protection 
could indeed become “an exercise in which the winners are the ones 
who hide the ball.”204  Ironically, the Supreme Court’s very mandate to 
embed race-consciousness in a flexible, holistic admissions process 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to fulfill its other desire to 
eliminate use of race completely.205 
3. Two Possible Definitions of “Race-Neutral” 
The question posed by this Section is “what does race-neutral 
mean in an admissions process?”  Building from the above analysis, 
there are at least two possible definitions of “race-neutral” in university 
admissions.206 
 
 
 203  See supra note 161. 
 204  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 205  There are commentators who posit that stealth in pursuing race-conscious 
policies, which ultimately leads to the difficulty in eliminating use of race, could itself 
be a constitutional value.  See Paul Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 
(1983) (“The indirectness of the less explicitly numerical systems may have significant 
advantages, not so much in terms of the processes of consideration as in the felt impact 
of their operation over time.  The description of race as simply ‘another factor’ among 
a lot of others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority 
students are separate and different and the recipients of special dispensations; the use 
of more explicitly separate and structured systems might have the opposite effect.”); 
Daniel Sabbagh, Judicial Uses of Subterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered, 118 POL. SCI. 
Q. 411, 412 (2003) (“[T]he very nature of what may be conceived as the ultimate goal 
of affirmative action—namely, the deracialization of American society, insofar as racial 
identification remains inextricably bound up with a constellation of inegalitarian 
assumptions—would make it counterproductive to fully disclose that policy’s most 
distinctive and most contentious features—its nonmeritocratic component and the 
extent to which some of these programs take race into account. . . .[I]n several 
Supreme Court decisions . . . judges have made a significant, yet underappreciated, 
contribution to that rational process of minimizing the visibility and distinctiveness of 
race-based affirmative action.”); Heather Gerkin, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of 
Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (2007) (characterizing Justices Powell and 
O’Connor’s views as “something akin to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to race-
conscious decisionmaking: use race, but don’t be obvious about it” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 206  See also Harpalani, supra note 16, at 850–55 (discussing two different meanings 
of race-neutrality). 
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One possible definition is formal race-neutrality, the complete 
absence of race from the application—or at least the complete absence 
of consideration of race in the admissions process.  The Supreme 
Court to date has subscribed to such a definition, by presuming that 
the absence of race “on the cover of every application”207 would 
eliminate consideration of race.  As discussed earlier, the mere facial 
presence or absence of race, in the form of a self-identification box 
checked by the applicant, is far from the only manner in which race 
comes into play in a holistic admissions process.208  If the Justices stick 
to this focus on facial presence of race, then “race-neutral” may lose 
any tangible meaning, because as Justices Ginsburg and Souter have 
warned,209 and as the UC controversies have illustrated,210 race may 
continue to play a role in admissions even if the admissions policy is 
facially race-neutral. 
Even for a non-holistic, mechanical admissions policy, facial race-
neutrality might not equate to formal race-neutrality if the purpose of 
the admissions policy is taken into account.  The Top Ten Percent Law 
itself poses this conundrum, as it is facially race-neutral but was 
motivated by a desire to increase racial diversity—specifically the 
numerical representation of African American and Latina/o 
students.211 
A second possible definition of “race-neutral” is statistical, 
focusing on disparities between minority and non-minority admitted 
applicants on academic criteria such as grades and standardized test 
scores.  Under this definition, rather than examining on the presence 
or consideration of race in the application process, the focus would be 
on the result: are there any significant statistical disparities on 
academic criteria between admitted minority and non-minority 
applicants?  Plaintiffs in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz used data on such 
disparities as part of their claims—not so much to establish the fact of 
race-conscious admissions policies (which was conceded by the 
universities in those cases), but rather to illustrate their magnitude.212  
It is worth noting that under a statistical definition of race-neutrality, 
the Top Ten Percent Law is also not race-neutral, as there are race 
disparities in the standardized test scores of students admitted under 
 
 207  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 54. 
 208  See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text. 
 209  See supra note 181. 
 210  See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. 
 211  See supra note 3.  The constitutionality of the Top Ten Percent Law and other 
percentage plans, under the Equal Protection Clause, has not been challenged to date, 
but such a challenge could occur in the future.  Id. 
 212  See supra note 183. 
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the plan.213  Nevertheless, in a holistic admissions process, absent a 
university’s admitted use of race in admissions, a statistical definition 
of race-neutrality is the only viable one—and even then, the issue of 
intent looms for any Plaintiffs wishing to prove an Equal Protection 
violation.214  In a post-Grutter regime, courts may have to grapple with 
such scenarios. 
Of course, the Supreme Court’s quest to limit race-conscious 
admissions policies need not reach that far to curb such policies 
significantly.  Currently, for most universities, use of race is admittedly 
intentional and statistically detectable.  While rendering race-
conscious admissions policies unconstitutional might encourage 
surreptitious use of race,215 the Court could also limit their magnitude 
without eliminating them.  Such a limit might be more constitutionally 
enforceable than a total prohibition, since universities would not be 
incentivized to deny use of race altogether.  The next Section considers 
such limits on the magnitude of race-consciousness in admissions and 
argues that universities already place a de facto limit on their race-
conscious admissions policies—below their desired level of racial 
diversity. 
D. Limits on Race-Consciousness 
Besides limits on the educational benefits of diversity, limits on 
the magnitude of race-consciousness itself—the weight of race in the 
admissions process—could also serve as a limiting principle on 
universities’ use of race.  This could occur in one of two ways: courts 
could impose a limit on the weight of race in the admissions process, 
or universities’ desire to maintain academic selectivity, in terms of high 
grades and standardized test scores within their student bodies, could 
serve as a de facto limiting principle on their use of race as an 
admissions plus factor.  This Article argues that the latter is more often 
the actual limiting principle. 
1. Judicial Limits on the Weight of Race in the Admissions 
Process 
Although they have not done so, courts could interpret Grutter to 
place an upper limit on the weight of race in the admissions process.216  
Such a limit could apply even if a university had not fully attained the 
 
 213  See UT Results of Automatic Admissions Law Report, supra note 168, at 14 tbl. 7 
and data from this source given in note 168. 
 214  See text accompanying supra notes 201–202. 
 215  See supra notes 181, 190–199 and accompanying text. 
 216  Ayres & Foster, supra note 72, at 558. 
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educational benefits of diversity.  The “stigmatic harm” of using race,217 
the constitutional burden on non-minority applicants,218 or the 
purported harm to minority students (i.e., “mismatch” theory)219 could 
serve as the constitutional justification for such a limit.  Courts would 
limit how much of an admissions “plus” factor race can be, regardless 
of whether universities could attain greater educational benefits from 
more racially diverse student bodies.  The Grutter majority articulated 
two narrow tailoring provisions that seemingly refer to the weight given 
to race in the admissions process:  (1) Race cannot be the 
“predominant factor” in admissions;220 and (2) The race-conscious 
policy cannot “unduly burden” non-minority applicants.221 
However, Grutter did not elaborate on these provisions,222 and 
there is no consistent weight given to race for individual applicants in 
a constitutional, holistic admissions plan: the weight could only be 
measured in aggregate, for an entire admitted class.223  Using the 
weight for race as a limiting principle would be a difficult undertaking, 
for many of the same reasons that using a diversity limit is difficult.  It 
would be tantamount to the cost-benefit analysis suggested by 
Professors Ayres and Foster,224 and even they acknowledge that “[i]t is 
 
 217  See sources cited supra note 79.  
 218  See sources cited supra note 80.   
 219  See Sander & Taylor, supra note 81. 
 220  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There 
is no constitutional objection to the goal of considering race as one modest factor 
among many others to achieve diversity, but an educational institution must ensure . . . 
that race does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.”).  
Because Justice Kennedy wrote the Fisher majority opinion and is now the swing vote 
on the Supreme Court, his Grutter dissent takes on greater significance.  In fact, Justice 
Kennedy’s Grutter dissent was the basis for Fisher.  See infra note 245. 
 221  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“To be narrowly tailored, a 
race-conscious admissions program must not “unduly burden individuals who are not 
members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.”) (citing Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990). 
 222  The Grutter majority did state that “in the context of its individualized inquiry 
into the possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School’s race-
conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”  
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.  However, the Grutter majority does not provide any general 
guidance here as to how an “undue burden” relates to the weight given to race in the 
admissions process.  See also Ayres & Foster, supra note 72, at 558 (contending that “the 
Grutter Court failed to offer a theory for where the line should be drawn between 
programs that weight race too heavily and those that do not”). 
 223  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 528 n.289 and accompanying text.  For methods 
of measuring “aggregate weight,” see, e.g., Ayres & Foster, supra note 72 (suggesting 
various ways of measuring weight of race in admissions); See ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, 
supra note 161, at 92–93 (2009) (calculating values of race as a “plus” factor in terms 
of standardized test score enhancement at public and private institutions). 
 224  Ayres & Foster, supra note 72, at 580. 
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difficult to quantify the burdens of racial preferences and even more 
difficult to quantify government interests in nonremedial affirmative 
action.”225  Any determination of how much weight should be given to 
race—how much harm or burden should be allowed to attain the 
benefits of diversity—is contingent on value judgments on which there 
are a wide variety of opinions.  Charged debates about these issues are 
unavoidable in resolving disputes about race-conscious admissions 
policies.  If it comes to bear, political considerations and the 
ideological positions of judges, and ultimately of Justices on the 
Supreme Court, will likely be the main factor in determining the 
answer to the question of “how much.” 
2. Universities’ Academic Selectivity as the De Facto 
Limiting Principle 
Universities are already imposing their own de facto limits on 
race-conscious admissions policies.  In spite of the use of these policies, 
African American and Latina/o students continue to be 
underrepresented at selective universities,226 and most universities 
would like to have greater representation of racial minorities in their 
student bodies than they currently do.  If universities are not enrolling 
a critical mass and fully attaining the educational benefits of diversity, 
what is the limiting principle on their actual use of race-conscious 
admissions policies?  Other considerations, such as ensuring race does 
not become a “predominate factor” in admissions, or maintaining 
particular grade and standardized test score profiles, appear to limit 
universities’ race-conscious admissions policies before a critical mass is 
attained.227 
The latter is most likely to be the de facto limiting principle at 
elite institutions, where academic disparities between minority and 
non-minority applicants are the main reason that race is necessary as a 
“plus” factor.  Professor Thomas Espenshade and Dr. Alexandria 
 
 225  Id. at 583. 
 226  See SEAN F. REARDON, RACHEL BAKER & DANIEL KLASIK, RACE, INCOME, AND 
ENROLLMENT PATTERNS IN HIGHLY SELECTIVE COLLEGES, 1982–2004 (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/race%20income%20%26%20selective
%20college%20enrollment%20august%203%202012.pdf (“Black and Hispanic 
students are dramatically underrepresented in the most selective colleges, even after 
controlling for family income.”); Josh Keller, At Top Colleges, an Admissions Gap for 
Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/ 
07/education/college-admissions-gap.html (“Roughly 15 percent of public high 
school graduates are black.  But despite the widespread use of affirmative action at 
elite colleges, only one college with a graduation rate of more than 70 percent has that 
many black students in its freshman class.”). 
 227  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 480–83. 
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Walton report the magnitude of standardized test score differences 
between admitted minority and non-minority admitted applicants in 
their studies of public and private institutions.228  For Fall 1997, in their 
sample of 7,410 accepted applicants at several selective private 
institutions, Professor Espenshade and Dr. Walton reported that, 
compared to White admittees, race-related admissions plus factors 
were equivalent to 310 points (out of 1600 total) for Black admittees 
and 130 points for Hispanic admittees, while Asian admittees 
outscored Whites by 140 points.229  If universities would like to have 
more racially diverse student bodies than they currently do, the most 
likely limiting factor is their own unwillingness to further compromise 
their standardized test score profiles in order to do so—since lower 
standardized test score profiles have consequences for universities’ 
academic reputations,230 or perhaps because universities believe that 
students with lower grades and test scores would not be academically 
successful.231  Grutter does not require universities to compromise 
 
 228  ESPENSHADE & RADFORD, supra note 161, at 92–93. 
 229  See id. at 92–93, 412.  The disparity between White and Asian American 
admittees has also raised controversy for a number of years.  See, e.g., Jerry Kang, 
Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin’s Defense of 
Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 1 (1996); DANA Y. TAKAGI, THE RETREAT 
FROM RACE: ASIAN-AMERICAN ADMISSIONS AND RACIAL POLITICS (1998).  In Fisher, Asian 
American advocacy groups have filed amici briefs both supporting and opposing race-
conscious admissions policies.  See Brief of the Asian American Legal Foundation and 
the 80-20 National Asian-American Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), en banc 
denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 09-50822) (amicus brief supporting Abigail 
Fisher on remand); Brief of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Asian/Asian American Faculty and Staff Association of the University of Texas at 
Austin, and Asian Desi Pacific Islander American Collective Of the University of Texas 
at Austin as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Fisher v. Texas, 758 
F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), en banc denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 09-50822) 
(amicus brief supporting UT on remand); Brief of Amici Curiae Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 
(5th Cir. 2014), en banc denied, 771 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 09-50822) (amicus 
brief supporting UT on remand). 
 230  See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355–56 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he  [University of Michigan] Law 
School seeks . . . [to enroll a racially diverse student body] . . . without sacrificing too 
much of its exclusivity and elite status.”).  Justice Thomas also devoted one section of 
his Grutter dissent to critiquing use of standardized tests and the notion of merit at 
selective institutions.  See supra note 151. 
 231  See Sander & Taylor, supra note 176.  Professors Sander and Taylor believe that 
universities currently compromise academic selectivity too much with their race-
conscious admissions policies.  Nevertheless, at some reduced level, universities may 
accept Sander and Taylor’s mismatch theory and limit their race-conscious admissions 
policies accordingly. 
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overall academic selectivity in order to achieve racial diversity,232 and 
thus implicitly defers to universities to strike the balance between the 
two—subject only to the “undue burden” and predominant factor 
requirements.233 
As such, Fisher ignored the most significant reason that most 
universities use race-conscious admissions policies—because of 
differences on academic admissions criteria between minority and 
non-minority applicants.  The “logical end point” of race-conscious 
admissions will occur when these differences no longer exist: at that 
point, universities will not need to use race as an admissions plus factor 
to essentially compensate for these differences.234  Justice O’Connor 
implicitly acknowledged this reality in her Grutter opinion, even as she 
aspired to see an end to race-conscious admissions: 
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the 
use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in 
the context of public higher education.  Since that time, the 
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has 
indeed increased.  We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today.235 
Justice O’Connor’s statement implies that the need for race-conscious 
admissions policies is at least in part contingent upon racial disparities 
on academic criteria.  In spite of their vast ideological differences, both 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas acknowledged that racial 
disparities on academic criteria are the underlying reason why 
universities need to use race-conscious admissions policies, and they 
both questioned Justice O’Connor’s aspiration that racial disparities 
on academic criteria could be eliminated by 2028.236 
 
 232  See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 233  See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text. 
 234  Note that even this “logical end point” would occur only with respect to a 
statistical definition of race-neutrality.  See supra Part II.C.3.  There still would be no 
“logical end point” with respect to formal race-neutrality, because race cannot be 
completely removed from a holistic admissions process, and because the value of 
diversity has no intuitive end point or ceiling.  See supra Part II.C.3., supra Part I.A., and 
supra notes 178–182, 192–199, and accompanying text. 
 235  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added). 
 236  See id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[I]t remains the current reality that 
many minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educational 
opportunities.  Despite these inequalities, some minority students are able to meet the 
high threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s finest undergraduate 
and graduate educational institutions.  As lower school education in minority 
communities improves, an increase in the number of such students may be 
anticipated.  From today’s vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that 
over the next generation’s span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely 
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Universities can thus argue that they need to continue using race-
conscious admissions policies to attain the educational benefits of 
diversity, and that they actually stop short of fully attaining those 
benefits because of their interest in academic selectivity, or in ensuring 
that race does not become a predominant factor in admissions.  So 
long as the Supreme Court does not require universities to choose 
between academic selectivity of students and racial diversity,237  this will 
be a valid argument—and it will be more doctrinally and conceptually 
robust than any diversity-related limit.238 
Of course, after Fisher, litigants may also raise questions about 
whether universities are actually attaining the educational benefits of 
diversity, which justify their use of race-conscious admissions policies.  
Universities face a greater burden to demonstrate these educational 
benefits in tangible fashion.  The next Part examines two relatively 
novel strategies that universities could use to defend race-conscious 
admissions policies, taking advantage of the deference the Supreme 
Court has given them in by defining their educational missions.  
Universities can employ the broad nature of the diversity interest to 
pursue diversity within racial groups, and to promote race-conscious 
campus spaces—highlighting how both of these facilitate the 
educational benefits of diversity articulated in Grutter and Fisher. 
III. RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND UNIVERSITIES’ EDUCATIONAL 
MISSIONS 
This Article does not attempt to resolve the internal tensions and 
contradictions in Supreme Court’s doctrine on race-conscious 
university admissions.239  The incongruent combination of the broad 
diversity interest and the call for race-neutrality is likely a result of 
 
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.”); Id. at 375–76 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on 
any evidence that the gap in credentials between black and white students is shrinking 
or will be gone in that timeframe . . . . No one can seriously contend, and the Court 
does not, that the racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years.”).  As 
noted earlier, Justice O’Connor herself later suggested that 25 years was not a binding 
time limit on race-conscious admissions, and both parties in Fisher agreed.  See supra 
note 141. 
 237  The Grutter majority held that universities are not required to compromise 
academic selectivity of students in order to attain racial diversity in their student 
bodies.  See text accompanying supra note 151. 
 238  See supra Part I for critiques of diversity-related limits on race-conscious 
university admissions. 
 239  See also Harpalani, supra note 16, at 841–46 (describing internal tensions in 
Supreme Court’s race jurisprudence as “Bermuda Triangle of university admissions”). 
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compromises between various Justices on the Court,240 in conjunction 
with the Court’s need to maintain institutional legitimacy by adhering 
to precedent.241  Eventually, the Court will either have to curb the 
broad diversity interest, or it will have to accept the fact that for the 
foreseeable future, universities will need to use race-conscious 
admissions policies to attain that interest.242  But for now, this Article 
aims to advise universities on defending race-conscious admissions 
policies after Fisher. 
Fisher’s call for stringent review of the need for race-conscious 
admissions will continue to spur litigation to challenge race-conscious 
admissions.  In fact, an organization ironically named “Students for 
Fair Admissions” has already filed two such lawsuits—challenging race-
conscious admissions policies at Harvard University and the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.243  More such challenges can be 
expected in the future. 
Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court’s broad definition of 
the compelling interest in diversity, universities can define their 
educational missions in a manner that justifies their race-conscious 
admissions policies.  The Supreme Court has given universities 
deference in defining their educational missions,244 affording them the 
opportunity to link race-conscious goals with race-conscious means.  
To defend their use of race in admissions, universities should tie the 
educational benefits of diversity on their campuses not just to racial 
representation, but to race-consciousness itself. 
 
 
 240  See supra note 2. 
 241  See Boddie, supra note 7 (“Fisher may suggest that the Court has become 
concerned about its institutional legitimacy and, therefore, is now wary of issuing 
sweeping decisions that depart radically from precedent.”). 
 242  Of course, it is possible that the Supreme Court may not revisit this issue—if 
more state bans on affirmative action render it moot, or if universities stop using race-
conscious admissions policies for other reasons.  Given the Court’s rulings in Fisher 
and Schuette, the conservative-leaning Justices may—at least for the time being—prefer 
to allow the lower courts or political process to dismantle race-conscious programs 
rather than issuing a broad ruling to do so.  See supra notes 2, 16. 
 243  Nick Anderson, Lawsuits Allege Unlawful Racial Bias in Admissions at Harvard, 
UNC-Chapel Hill, WASH.  POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/lawsuits-allege-unlawful-racial-bias-in-admissions-at-harvard-unc-
chapel-hill/2014/11/17/b117b966-6e9a-11e4-ad12-3734c461eab6_story.html; Lyle 
Denniston, Direct New Challenges to Bakke Ruling (FURTHER UPDATE), SCOTUSBLOG 
(Nov. 17, 2014, 10:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/direct-new-
challenges-to-bakke-ruling/. 
 244  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (“[A] university’s ‘educational judgment 
that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer.’”) 
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003)). 
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This Article suggests two relatively novel ways that universities 
incorporate can race-consciousness into their missions, as part of the 
diversity interest: (1) Highlighting the educational benefits of diversity 
that occur within race-conscious campus spaces.; and (2)  Emphasizing 
the educational benefits of diversity within racial groups and 
intragroup support among minority students.  Universities should also 
tie these aspects of the diversity interest to their need for race-
conscious admissions to attain that interest. 
A. Judicial Deference to Universities in Defining their Educational 
Missions 
Judicial deference to universities was the one issue resolved by the 
Supreme Court in Fisher.  One might have expected this result, as 
Justice Kennedy’s Grutter dissent contended that the Grutter majority 
“confuses deference to a university’s definition of its educational 
objective with deference to the implementation of this goal,”245 and the 
Fisher majority opinion was consistent with this view.  The Fisher 
majority made clear that a “[u]niversity receives no deference” from 
the reviewing court on whether the “means chosen by the [u]niversity 
to attain diversity are narrowly tailored[.]”246  Fisher called for “a careful 
judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient 
diversity without using racial classifications[,]”247 and this was the basis 
for vacating the Fifth Circuit opinion.248 
 
 
 
 245  Id. at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 246  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 247  Id. 
 248  Id. at 2421 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals confined the strict 
scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its 
use of racial classifications and affirming the grant of summary judgment on that 
basis. . . . [T]he Court of Appeals must assess whether the University has offered 
sufficient evidence that would prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored 
to obtain the educational benefits of diversity.”).  My prior article partially 
foreshadowed the result in Fisher.  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 526 (“If the Supreme 
Court adopted . . . [the test that I propose] . . . it would vacate the Fifth Circuit ruling 
in Fisher, but it would not declare UT’s race-conscious policy to be unconstitutional.  
Rather, it would remand the case for review based on the more stringent standard 
proposed here.”). Compare Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421 (stating that UT has to “prove that 
its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the educational benefits of 
diversity”), with Harpalani, supra note 26, at 526 (stating that UT should have to prove 
that its race-conscious policy is “narrowly tailored to fit the compelling interest of 
attaining within-group diversity and its educational benefits”).  The Supreme Court 
called for the same standard as did my article, although not for the same reasons; it 
did not address the issue of within-group diversity, which was the specific focus of my 
prior article. 
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However, given the broad diversity interest espoused by the Court, 
Fisher’s deference to universities in determining their educational 
missions is just as significant.249  First Amendment values provide the 
basis for judicial deference to universities in defining their educational 
missions.  Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion noted that “[t]he freedom of 
a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body[,]”250 citing the last of Justice Felix 
Frankfurter’s “four essential freedoms” that constitute academic 
freedom: “‘who may be admitted to study.’”251  Grutter reinforced this 
idea, noting a “constitutional dimension, grounded in the First 
Amendment, of educational autonomy[,]”252 for universities.253  The 
 
 249  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“According to Grutter, a university’s ‘educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we 
defer.’  539 U.S. at 328, 123 S. Ct. 2325.  Grutter concluded that the decision to pursue 
‘the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity,’ Id. at 330, 123 S. Ct. 
2325, that the University deems integral to its mission is, in substantial measure, an 
academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper 
under Grutter.”). 
 250  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
 251  Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262–63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (“[D]ependence of a free society on free universities . . . means the 
exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university . . . . It is 
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to 
speculation, experiment and creation.  It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the 
four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds 
who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted 
to study.”). 
 252  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).   
 253  It should be noted that this “constitutional dimension” is not a full-fledged First 
Amendment right, which would entail much more freedom from government 
intrusion.  Deference to universities in choosing their student bodies is limited to the 
judiciary.  State legislatures can pass laws which curb this “essential freedom.”  Texas’s 
Top Ten Percent Law itself is a prime example: it automatically determines 80 percent 
of UT’s incoming class and thus takes it out of the University’s control.  See supra note 
3.  Legislative or executive action can eliminate race-conscious university admissions.  
See supra notes 17–19.  State constitutional provisions passed via popular referenda can 
also curb a university’s freedom to choose its own student body, by eliminating race-
conscious admissions.  See supra note 17.  The Supreme Court recently upheld such 
state constitutional bans.  Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 134 
S. Ct. 1623 (2014).  Given all of these allowable government and popular intrusions 
on their autonomy, deference to universities does not imply that they have a 
constitutional right to choose their student bodies, despite the language in Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy.  See Paul Horowitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 
B.C. L. REV. 461, 481–94 (2005) (“[T]he freedom ‘to determine . . . who may be 
admitted to study’ . . . [is] . . . the jurisprudential roots of Bakke and Grutter and their 
command of deference to university admissions programs.  But if Justice Frankfurter’s 
Sweezy concurrence has provided fertile ground for future doctrinal developments, it 
is not because his opinion provides a meaningful definition of constitutional academic 
freedom or proper guidance on its application.  To the contrary, Sweezy’s influence 
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Fisher majority noted that “the District Court and Court of Appeals 
were correct in finding that Grutter calls for deference to the 
University’s conclusion, ‘“based on its experience and expertise,”‘ . . . 
that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals.”254 
Fisher did state that such judicial deference was “not complete”—
that the “court . . . should ensure that there is a reasoned, principled 
explanation for the [university’s] academic decision.”255  Nevertheless, 
Fisher and Grutter’s articulation of the educational benefits of diversity, 
which include “lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes[,]”256 
“promot[ing] cross-racial understanding,”257 and “enabl[ing] 
[students] to better understand persons of different races[,]”258 all 
suggest principled explanations for incorporating race-conscious 
goals, in various forms, into a university’s educational mission.  
Universities can define their educational missions in a manner that 
emphasizes these educational benefits of diversity and tie these 
benefits more directly to their race-conscious admissions policies. 
B. Race-Conscious Goals as Part of the Compelling Interest in Diversity 
By giving universities deference in defining their educational 
missions, the Supreme Court inherently gives universities the power to 
determine the educational benefits of diversity—and thus to give 
content to the compelling interest in diversity.  Of course, this power 
is not absolute; it is rooted in the Court’s rulings in Bakke, Grutter, and 
Fisher—but these rulings all incorporate race-conscious goals.259  As 
 
stems from the combination of its sweeping grandiloquent rhetoric and its lack of real 
guidance for future courts.”).  Rather, deference to universities appears to be a part of 
judicial balancing in the context of race-based equal protection.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 362 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court bases its unprecedented deference to the 
Law School . . . on an idea of ‘educational autonomy’ grounded in the First 
Amendment[] . . . [that] the First Amendment authorizes a public university to do 
what would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 254  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).  See also Eboni S.Nelson, In Defense 
of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational Autonomy and Expert Judgments in Fisher v. 
Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133 (2013). 
 255  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
 256  Id. at 2418.  See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (holding that “substantial, important, 
and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce, include[e] 
cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes.”); Id. at 319 
(noting that “critical mass” entails ““numbers such that underrepresented minority 
students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”). 
 257  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce . . . are substantial [and include] promot[ing] ‘cross-racial 
understanding,’ . . . break[ing] down racial stereotypes, and ‘enabl[ing] [students] to 
better understand persons of different races.’”). 
 258  Id. 
 259  See supra notes 153–156, 256–258, and accompanying text. 
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such, race-consciousness is part of the compelling interest in diversity, 
and universities can readily articulate a “reasoned, principled 
explanation”260 for incorporating it into their educational missions in 
various forms—particularly if they can produce empirical data relating 
it to the compelling interest.261  In this vein, two specific race-conscious 
goals that university can pursue in this vein are: (1) emphasizing the 
educational benefits of diversity within racial groups and intragroup 
support among minority students; and (2) highlighting the 
educational benefits of diversity that occur within race-conscious 
campus spaces. 
1. Diversity Within Racial Groups 
Diversity within racial groups represents a particularly nuanced 
form of race-consciousness—one that inherently transcends the 
tension between racial diversity and racial stereotyping in 
constitutional jurisprudence.262  The idea of diversity within racial 
groups as part of Grutter’s compelling interest is a relatively new one.263  
 
 260  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (“According to Grutter, a university’s ‘educational 
judgment that . . . diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we 
defer.’  Grutter concluded that the decision to pursue ‘the educational benefits that 
flow from student body diversity,’ . . . that the University deems integral to its mission 
is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, 
judicial deference is proper under Grutter.  A court, of course, should ensure that there 
is a reasoned, principled explanation for the academic decision.  On this point, the 
District Court and Court of Appeals were correct in finding that Grutter calls for 
deference to the University’s conclusion, “‘based on its experience and expertise,’” . . . 
that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals.”). 
 261  Cf. Meera Deo, Empirically Derived Compelling State Interests in Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 661 (2014) (proposing that empirical data can support 
new compelling state interests for race-conscious policies).  This Article argues that 
race-consciousness is inherently part of the existing compelling interest in the 
educational benefits of diversity. 
 262  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 495 (discussing how diversity within racial 
groups facilitates substantive educational benefits such as breaking down racial 
stereotypes and also allows a race-conscious policy to mitigate racial stereotyping 
during admissions process); Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkination: 
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1299 (2011) 
(noting that “Justice O’Connor interprets equal protection so as to promote social 
cohesion and to avoid racial arrangements that balkanize and threaten social 
cohesion.  Concern with balkanization thus supplies affirmative reason to allow 
affirmative action and to limit it . . .”). 
 263  The first law review article to articulate this idea was my prior article, Diversity 
Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, supra note 26.  
Professor Devon Carbado also later analyzed intraracial diversity as a compelling 
interest.  See Carbado, supra note 44.  Additionally, Professor Elise Boddie authored a 
short commentary on within-group diversity while she was Acting Litigation Director 
of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc.  Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: The 
Importance of Diversity Within Diversity, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2012, 10:50 AM), 
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In Fisher, UT did not raise this argument until its Supreme Court 
brief,264 and UT’s counsel Gregory Garre also responded to questions 
about it at the Fisher oral arguments.265  However, in neither instance 
did UT defend the idea very well or elaborate on it much.266  It did not 
really link within-group diversity directly to the compelling interest in 
diversity,267 or to holistic admissions and Grutter’s narrow tailoring 
requirements.268 
There is firm ground to support diversity within racial groups as 
part of the compelling interest in diversity.  Justice Powell’s Bakke 
opinion first supported this notion,269 and Grutter specifically articulates 
 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/commentary-on-fisher-the-importance-of-
diversity-within-diversity.  
 264  Brief for Respondents at 33, Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)  (No. 11-
345) (“Holistic review permits the consideration of diversity within racial groups.”)  
This Article uses the term “diversity within racial groups” interchangeably with “within-
group diversity” and “intraracial diversity.” 
 265  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 43–45. 
 266  See Harpalani, supra note 49, at 63 (“UT had already built its argument about 
critical mass around classroom isolation of minority students: as a consequence, the 
reference to diversity within racial groups was cursory and seemed like a last-minute 
addition.”); Carbado, supra note 44, at 1179 (asserting that at the Supreme Court oral 
arguments in Fisher, there were “significant problems with the way in which the 
university’s counsel responded to . . . questions about intraracial diversity”).  
 267  In its brief to the Fifth Circuit on remand, UT did begin to make the link 
between diversity within racial groups and the compelling interest.  See Brief for 
Appellees, supra note 130, at 48 (“Ensuring a diversity of backgrounds—within racial 
groups—is one of the best ways to help breakdown racial stereotypes and promote 
cross-racial understanding, and often students who come from integrated 
environments are particularly successful in bridging racial barriers.  This is not news.  
The Harvard plan commended by the Supreme Court in Bakke itself recognized this 
added dimension of diversity.  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 323–24 (1978).”).  In spite of its pronouncement that “[t]his is not news,” 
UT did not initially incorporate the “diversity within racial groups” argument in its 
defense of race-conscious admissions: it raised the argument for the first time at the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  See Brief for Appellants, at 28, Fisher v. Texas, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 
09-50822).  (“UT asserted for the first time before the Supreme Court that its failure 
to achieve critical mass is a qualitative—not quantitative—problem because its real 
concern is a lack of ‘diversity within racial groups.’  . . . But UT raised this argument 
for the first time at the Supreme Court.  Naturally, then, there is nothing in the record 
demonstrating that UT relied on this interest when it reintroduced race in 2004 or 
retained it in 2007, or any evidence whatsoever supporting UT’s 
argument . . .”)(citation omitted). 
 268  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 494–95 (discussing how within-group diversity is 
related to both compelling interest and narrow tailoring requirements articulated in 
Grutter); Carbado, supra note 44, at 1163–72 (analyzing whether intraracial diversity 
can satisfy strict scrutiny by meeting compelling interest and narrow tailoring 
requirements of Grutter.). 
 269  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321 n.55 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[An] [a]dmissions 
Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between 
A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of 
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educational benefits related to within-group diversity.  The Grutter 
majority opinion noted that one of the goals of a race-conscious 
admissions policy is to produce a “critical mass” of minority students 
with a “variety of viewpoints.”270  Having such diversity within racial 
groups augments the educational benefits of diversity, such as breaking 
down racial stereotypes: “[W]hen a critical mass of underrepresented 
minority students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because 
nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but rather 
a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”271  Grutter’s language 
thus suggests that “meaningful representation”272 of minority students 
depends not only upon numbers of minority students, but also on 
sufficiently diverse perspectives within racial groups.273  Students with 
such different perspectives help break down racial stereotypes and 
facilitate the educational benefits of diversity—the constitutional 
justification for race-conscious admissions policies in the first place.  
When understood in terms of these educational benefits, there is a 
strong argument that diversity within racial groups is part of the 
compelling interest in diversity.274 
Other language from Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher also reinforces the 
notion of within-group diversity as part of the compelling interest.  In 
 
superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of 
semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had 
demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding interest in black 
power.  If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already 
been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.”).  Justice Powell gave 
this example when discussing the Harvard College Admissions Program.  Id.  The 
Court also cited Justice Powell’s example in its Gratz decision.  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 272–73 (2003). 
 270  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 320 (2003). 
 271  Id. at 319–20.  See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need for 
critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express 
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’ . . . . To the contrary, diminishing 
the force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and 
one that it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.”).  This 
language in Grutter speaks to the immediate, proximal impact of having a “critical 
mass.” 
 272  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. 
 273  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 478 n.48 (“[T]here cannot be sufficient within-
group diversity if there are not adequate numbers of a particular minority group.  
However, no particular number or percentage of a given racial group automatically 
guarantees that within-group diversity is present.”). 
 274  See id. at 478 (arguing that “different experiences and perspectives within racial 
groups” can be understood as “directly related to the compelling interest articulated 
in Grutter”); Carbado, supra note 44, at 1164 (agreeing that “intraracial diversity can 
function as a compelling state interest for affirmative action admissions”).  Professor 
Carbado also analyzes the relationship between intraracial diversity and the 
educational benefits he lists from Grutter.  Id. at 1145–46, 1164. 
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describing the diversity interest, these cases state that: 
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a 
specified percentage of the student body is in effect 
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with 
the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation 
of students.  The diversity that furthers a compelling state 
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single 
though important element.275 
By its very nature, within-group diversity cannot be attained by 
admitting a specific percentage of any racial or ethnic group.276  
Moreover, diversity within racial groups also inherently requires 
admissions committees to pay attention to factors other than race 
when making admissions decisions.277  Justice O’Connor’s Grutter 
majority opinion implied that admissions committees should not view 
all individuals of the same race in exactly the same way,278 which is a 
hallmark feature of within-group diversity as an admissions factor.279 
While there have been numerous studies of the educational 
benefits of diversity more generally,280 these have not focused on 
diversity within racial groups.281  Nevertheless, there are many 
possibilities here as well.  Various campus events, sponsored by 
students-of-color organizations and cultural centers on campus, 
 
 275  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (quoting Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).  See also 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324–25 (quoting same language from Justice Powell’s Bakke 
opinion). 
 276  Harpalani, supra note 26, at 478. 
 277  Id. at 495. 
 278  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“[A] university’s admissions program must remain 
flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in 
a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her 
application . . . [T]he Law School’s race-conscious admissions program adequately 
ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully 
considered alongside race in admissions decisions.”). 
 279  Harpalani, supra note 26, at 495. 
 280  See, e.g., sources cited supra note 43. 
 281  Professor Carbado notes that “[I]ntraracial selections take place . . . with 
relatively little . . . engagement on the part of scholars.”  Carbado, supra note 44, at 
1139.  He cites my prior article as an “important exception.”  Id. at 1139 n.36.  A few 
studies have begun to assess within-group diversity on college campuses in more depth.  
See, e.g., Camille Z. Charles, Camille Z., Kimberly C. Torres & Rachelle J. Brunn, Black 
Like Who? Exploring the Racial, Ethnic, and Class Diversity of Black Students at Selective 
Colleges and Universities, 86 SOC. FORCES 561 (2007); KEVIN BROWN, BECAUSE OF OUR 
SUCCESS: THE CHANGING RACIAL & ETHNIC ANCESTRY OF BLACKS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
(2014).  Nevertheless, these studies seek mainly to understand and analyze within-
group demographics rather than to identify and document potential educational 
benefits of within-group diversity. 
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involve debates and discussions that emphasize different within-group 
perspectives.  For example, there are discussions about relations 
between African American and African or Afro-Caribbean students on 
campus, integrationist versus nationalist ideals among Black students, 
and within-group student coalitions that bring together various Black, 
Asian American, and Latina/o groups.282  White students and students 
from a variety of other ethnic backgrounds attend these events and 
participate in these groups, learning about different perspectives 
firsthand—probably more so than in most classrooms.283  Universities 
can document these events and collect information from them, to 
illustrate the educational benefits of within-group diversity—most 
notably for lessening racial stereotypes and promoting cross-racial 
understanding. 
Additionally, diversity within racial groups may contribute to the 
compelling interest in another significant way: by preventing minority 
students from feeling “isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”284  
Another reason to have a mix of minority students from higher and 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds is that the former, who have often 
 
 282  For example, at the University of Pennsylvania, there is a coalition of various 
Black student groups called UMOJA, UMOJA, UPENN, http://www.dolphin.upenn. 
edu/umoja/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015); a coalition of various Latina/o student groups 
called the Latino Coalition, Latino Coalition, UPENN, https:// upennlc.wordpress.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015); and a coalition of various Asian American groups called the 
Asian Pacific Student Coalition (APSC), APSC, UPENN, http://www.upennapsc.org/ 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2015).  Additionally, the United Minorities Council (UMC) at the 
University of Pennsylvania is an umbrella group that brings together all the various 
students-of-color organizations.  See United Minorities Council, UPENN, 
http://unitedminoritiescouncil.org/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).  Such groups regularly 
sponsor events that tackle within-group diversity.  For example, when I was at Penn, 
Black student organizations frequently sponsored educational events that involved 
debates between Black nationalists and integrationists on a variety of issues. 
 283  See, e.g., Rebecca Borison, United Minorities Council kicks off Unity Month, DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN (Nov. 11, 2012, 10:43 PM),  http://www.thedp.com/article/2012/ 
11/united-minorities-council-kicks-off-unity-month (noting that out-of-class events 
during United Minorities Council’s Unity Month aim to foster “exchange of ideas . . . 
between students from all different backgrounds”) (internal quotations omitted).  
Another aim of Unity Month is to “bridge the gap between Penn and its surrounding 
community [predominantly Black and working class West Philadelphia].”  Id.  This 
aim also promotes cross-racial understanding and helps to lessen racial stereotypes—
both of which are part of the compelling interest that justify race-conscious admissions 
policies.  Moreover, Penn could tie this compelling interest directly to its race-
conscious admissions policy, by “augment[ing] its outreach in surrounding 
neighborhoods . . . [and] recruit[ing] more students directly from West 
Philadelphia  . . . . [thereby] creat[ing] a renewed sense of connection to the local 
community.”  Vinay Harpalani, Diversity and Community Upliftment, DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN (Mar., 13, 2013, 12:55 AM), http://www.thedp.com/article/ 
2013/03/vinay-harpalani-diversity-and-community-upliftment.  
 284  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003). 
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attended predominantly White schools in affluent districts or elite, 
private schools, may help the latter adjust socially to elite, 
predominantly White universities and feel less isolated on those 
campuses.  Shanta Driver, a lawyer for the student intervenors in 
Grutter, raised this point at a debate on affirmative action shortly after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Grutter.  An audience member asked Ms. 
Driver why affirmative action should benefit more privileged members 
of minority groups.  She responded by stating that at University of 
Michigan, about one-half of the Black undergraduate students come 
from relatively privileged families, while the other half come from 
inner-city Detroit, and that the “reason [Black students from the inner-
city] survive on campus is because of the [more privileged Black 
students].”285 
Ms. Driver’s assertion is unproven but very important to consider.  
At the Fisher oral argument, Justice Samuel Alito characterized UT’s 
race-conscious admissions policy as a preference for minority students 
from privileged backgrounds286—but this critique is significantly 
mitigated if these privileged students enhance the college experience 
of their less privileged peers.  It is certainly a reasonable hypothesis 
that affluent minority students can serve as social supports for their less 
privileged same-race peers.287  Moreover, student peers are present at 
social events and in residence halls late at night,288 when other 
university services may not be readily available.  Of course, universities 
need to admit underprivileged minority students for these effects to 
occur.  Elite universities in particular have been criticized—often 
deservedly so—for admitting mostly affluent and privileged minority 
students.289  In addition to Justice Alito’s critique above, this may also 
 
 285  See Harpalani, supra note 49, at 64–65 nn.57–58 and accompanying text.  I 
cannot verify the numbers or the assertion by Ms. Driver, but I have witnessed similar 
examples of intragroup social support among minority students.  Intragroup social 
support among minority students is a well-founded hypothesis and worthy of more 
empirical investigation. 
 286  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 47, at 58–59. 
 287  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 514 n.226. 
 288  Harpalani, supra note 283 (“While the university has support services for 
underprivileged students, it is their classmates who are available to help them in 
classes, at social events and in the dormitories late at night.”). 
 289  Id. (contending that “elite, private universities  . . . . do exactly what Justice Alito 
maligned: preferring minority students from privileged schools over those who are less 
privileged”).  See also BROWN, supra note 281 (discussing changing racial and ethnic 
ancestry of Black students at selective universities); Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, 
Demise of the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of 
Ascendant Blacks at Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1231 
(2008) (questioning admissions policies “that lump[ ] all blacks into a single-category 
approach that pervades admissions decisions of so many selective colleges, universities, 
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fuel Justice Thomas’s concerns that “racial aesthetics” rather than 
substantive educational benefits drive race-conscious policies.290  
Diversity within racial groups requires attention not only to race, but 
also to socioeconomic status and other variables,291 and elite 
universities can do much better in ensuring that their student bodies 
are ethnically and socioeconomically diverse within racial groups.292 
While there have been many studies of campus climate and 
feelings of isolation among minority students generally,293 none have 
specifically explored if more privileged minority students help their 
less privileged, same-race peers navigate these challenges.  Universities 
should investigate whether such intragroup social support does occur 
among minority students.294  If so, such empirical research can further 
 
and graduate programs” and noting that with “the growing percentage of blacks with 
a white parent and foreign-born black immigrants and their sons and daughters” at 
selective institutions, “blacks whose predominate racial and ethnic heritage is traceable 
to the historical oppression of blacks in the U.S. are far more underrepresented than 
administrators, admissions committees, and faculties realize”); Kevin Brown, Should 
Black Immigrants Be Favored Over Black Hispanics and Black Multiracials in the Admissions 
Processes of Selective Higher Education Programs?, 54 HOW. L.J. 255, 302 (2011) (arguing 
that “admissions committees of selective higher education institutions should not 
provide treatment that is more favorable to Black immigrant applicants . . .”); Cara 
Anna, Immigrants Among Blacks at Colleges Raises Diversity Questions, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 
30, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/04/30/ 
immigrants_among_blacks_at_colleges_raises_diversity_questions/?page=2 (“The 
issue of native vs. immigrant blacks took hold at Harvard in 2004, when professors 
Henry Louis Gates and Lani Guinier pointed out at a black alumni reunion that a 
majority of attendees were of African or Caribbean origin.”). 
 290  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“A distinction between these two ideas (unique educational 
benefits based on racial aesthetics and race for its own sake) is purely sophistic—so 
much so that the majority uses them interchangeably.”).  See also Nancy Leong, Racial 
Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2156 (2013) (“The irony, then, is that our legal and 
social emphasis on diversity—while intended to produce progress toward a racially 
egalitarian society—has instead in many cases contributed to a state of affairs that . . . 
relegates nonwhite individuals to the status of ‘trophies’ or ‘passive emblems.’”) (citing 
Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1041 (2011)). 
 291  See Harpalani, supra note 26, at 496 (“By definition, achieving . . . within-group 
diversity . . . requires admissions committees to consider factors besides race and to 
treat applicants of the same race differently based on non-racial factors.”). 
 292  See supra note 289. 
 293  See supra note 102. 
 294  Moreover, in addition to intragroup social support, universities should also 
investigate intergroup social support: whether minority students of one group can serve 
as social supports for students of another group (for example, Black students 
supporting Native American or Asian American students).  See Harpalani, supra note 
26, at 483 (“[I]f there are African American and Latino students in a class who speak 
up and share their views, then a Native American student may feel more emboldened 
to do so. . . . [M]inority student organizations regularly collaborate on activities and 
interact and support one another at many institutions of higher education.”); see also 
Vinay Harpalani, Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Awakening: A South Asian Becoming 
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support the notion of diversity within racial groups as part of the 
compelling interest.  By highlighting the social and educational 
benefits of diversity within racial groups, universities can defend their 
continued use of race-conscious, holistic admissions policies. 
2. Race-Conscious Campus Spaces 
The educational benefits of diversity occur well beyond the 
classroom and in fact, may occur more commonly in extracurricular 
venues than in classes.  Yet in Fisher, UT’s defense largely focused on 
data showing minority underrepresentation in classes295—important 
data without a doubt, but limited in many ways.  While minority 
representation itself can help break down racial stereotypes, it is 
difficult to tie classroom diversity numbers to the tangible educational 
benefits of diversity espoused by the Supreme Court.  Even small, 
discussion-oriented classes, such as the ones noted by UT in its 
Supreme Court brief, may not always focus on cross-racial 
understanding or bring out different perspectives related to race.  A 
simple focus on classroom diversity also fuels the critique that 
universities’ interest in diversity is largely superficial.  In his Grutter 
dissent, Justice Clarence Thomas critiqued the majority’s reasoning by 
characterizing it in such terms: “Classroom aesthetics yield[] 
educational benefits, [race-conscious] admissions policies are 
required to achieve [racial diversity], and therefore the policies are 
required to achieve the educational benefits.”296  Given the ever-
continuing need to defend race-conscious admissions policies, 
universities should demonstrate that their efforts towards diversity go 
beyond numbers in classrooms—and they can do so by documenting 
the educational benefits of racial diversity not only in classrooms, but 
also in other campus venues. 
 
 
 
“Critically” Aware of Race in America, 11 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 71, 82 (2009) 
(citing NYU Law student symposium, “Can People of Color Become a United 
Coalition?” which focused on forging social and political relationships between 
different minority groups); All-ALSA Coalition Mixer, NYU LAW http://its.law. 
nyu.edu/eventcalendar/index.cfm?fuseaction=main.detail&id=20157 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2015) (noting that “[t]he All-ALSA Coalition is an alliance of NYU’s diversity 
groups that seeks to build community among diverse student groups and advocate 
collectively on their behalf”). 
 295  See Brief for Respondents, Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345); see also 
Harpalani, supra note 26, at 504–05. 
 296  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Thomas generally questions the link between racially diverse student bodies and any 
purported educational benefits.  Id. at 355–57. 
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A good place to start would be the most racially diverse 
environments on many college campuses: “race-conscious campus 
spaces.”  As defined in this Article, these are physical campus locations 
or campus initiatives and activities that focus on racial identity, 
whether for a specified racial group or in a more general sense (i.e., a 
campus lecture or film series on race).  Such spaces are often, though 
not always, “majority-minority” environments—where White students 
may not be a numerical majority or plurality on a regular basis.  These 
spaces can include ethnic studies departments and programs, campus 
cultural centers, and residence halls devoted to the study and 
experiences of a particular racial/ethnic group (e.g., African 
Americans), all of which contribute to the educational benefits of 
diversity. 
Legal and academic discourse on the benefits of diversity has 
focused on the presence of a “critical mass” of minority students in 
predominantly White settings.  Race-conscious spaces—although once 
thought to cater to specific groups and promote “institutionalized 
separatism”297—have now become the most racially diverse 
environments on college campuses.  For example, in the W.E.B. Du 
Bois College House, University of Pennsylvania’s residence hall 
devoted to African American studies, “46 percent of . . . residents 
report a racial identity other than African American.”298  The Du Bois 
College House website states: 
As the African American theme-based house, and in 
adhering to its original mission, most of the programs and 
events in Du Bois College House are based upon the history 
and culture of people of the African Diaspora.  However, in 
 
 297  See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 104 (1992) (decrying “black dormitories” and other ethnic 
spaces as “institutionalized separatism”).  See also WAYNE GLASKER, BLACK STUDENTS IN 
THE IVORY TOWER: AFRICAN AMERICAN STUDENT ACTIVISM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, 1967–1990, at 115–46 (2002) (describing opposition to W.E.B. Du Bois 
College House at University of Pennsylvania); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[U]niversities . . . talk the talk of 
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of tribalism and 
racial segregation on their campuses—through minority-only student organizations, 
separate minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, even 
separate minority-only graduation ceremonies.”). 
 298  Rachel E. Ryan, Turmoil and Transformation: Du Bois House Turns 40, PA. GAZETTE, 
Mar. | Apr. 2013, at 23–24.  This phenomenon is not unique to Du Bois College House 
or to Penn.  During my time as a Visiting Assistant Professor at Chicago-Kent College 
of Law, the most diverse student activity I have observed, in terms of attendance, was 
the Black Law Student Association’s “State of Black Chicago” Voting Rights 
Symposium in March 2013.  Each of the four panelists was of a different racial 
background, and of approximately 40 attendees, one-half appeared to be Black, while 
the remainder appeared to be from a variety of backgrounds. 
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recognizing the range of diversity within the House’s 
population, we must also acknowledge, not only its role as a 
microcosm of the Greater American society, but the House’s 
role in preparing our residents for the greater global world.  
Du Bois College House is one of the most diverse college 
houses on Penn’s campus, and often refers to itself as “the 
U.N. at UPenn!”  This means that the entire staff works hard 
to ensure that our programming is just as diverse as the 
population, and that it meets the needs of all residents.299 
Moreover, not only are these spaces quite racially diverse, but they also 
often focus directly on race-related dialogue and cultural exchange—
thus directly facilitating the educational benefits noted in Fisher.  The 
Du Bois website notes different events and activities that occur at Du 
Bois, many of which involve issues related to racial identity and 
equality, and also celebration of different cultural heritages.300  The 
discussions at these events, in conjunction with the diverse student 
population in Du Bois, epitomizes Grutter and Fisher’s values of 
promoting cross-racial interaction301 and “lessening of racial isolation 
and stereotypes.”302  Professor Kim Forde-Mazrui takes this one step 
further, arguing that “a foundation for good citizenship requires 
awakening students to the full range of American cultures which, in 
turn, requires exposing students to the full range of American races.”303 
This view of race-conscious campus spaces itself counters 
stereotypes of minority students.  For example, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
among others, has decried “tribalism and racial segregation on . . . 
 
 299  W.E.B. DU BOIS COLLEGE HOUSE, UPENN, http://dubois.house.upenn.edu/ 
frontpage (last visited Mar. 7, 2015); see also Ernest Owens, Farrah Alkhaleel, Simon 
Tesfalul & Taylor Blackston, Appreciating Du Bois as a Loving Home, DAILY 
PENNSYLVANIAN (Oct. 15, 2012, 1:14 AM), http://www.thedp.com/article/2012/ 
10/du-bois-house-council-appreciating-du-bois-as-a-loving-home (“Du Bois [College 
House] is not just a space for black students.  It is a college house for students of all 
cultures . . . Du Bois has evolved to serve as a college house for Penn students.  We 
haven’t forgotten our heritage, but we also wish to accommodate a more diverse group 
of residents.  We are no longer a college house that caters solely to the black 
community, but one that still emphasizes Africana interests through its 
programming.”). 
 300  W.E.B. DU BOIS COLLEGE HOUSE, UPENN, http://dubois.house.upenn.edu/ 
frontpage (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
 301  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (“[T]he educational benefits that diversity is designed 
to produce . .  . are substantial . . .  [and include] promot[ing] cross-racial 
understanding, . . . break[ing] down racial stereotypes, and enabl[ing] [students] to 
better understand persons of different races.”) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 302  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013). 
 303  Kim Forde-Mazrui, Does Racial Diversity Promote Cultural Diversity?: The Missing 
Question in Fisher v. University of Texas, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 987, 1017 (2013). 
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campuses—through minority-only student organizations, separate 
minority housing opportunities, separate minority student centers, 
even separate minority-only graduation ceremonies.”304  Justice Scalia 
is misinformed: none of these spaces and events excludes any 
individuals on the basis of race,305 and most are quite welcoming to 
students of all backgrounds, including interested White students.306  
 
 304  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 305  In fact, to do so would almost certainly be unconstitutional. 
 306  See supra notes 298–300 and accompanying text.  See also Harpalani, supra note 
294, at 81 (describing my experience of being welcomed by residents at Du Bois 
College House when I was a graduate resident advisor there).  Even beyond Du Bois 
College House, my personal experience supports this assertion.  As a student, I was 
involved in numerous undergraduate student-of-color organizations at the University 
of Pennsylvania, along with the Black Allied Law Students Association (BALSA) at New 
York University School of Law.  I have also been a faculty advisor for Black student 
organizations at Seattle University School of Law and Chicago-Kent College of Law, 
and I have observed the Black Law Students Association at Savannah Law School.  
Across all of these very different institutions, all the Black student organizations I have 
encountered have welcomed participation by students of all ethnicities, and many have 
sponsored events where attendance was more racially diverse than most other activities 
at their respective law schools.   
 A somewhat contrary finding is reported in recent issue of the Journal of Law and 
Economics.  See Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo, Andrew Hussey & Kenneth Spenner, 
Racial Segregation Patterns in Selective Universities, 56 J.L. & ECON. 1039, 1039 (2013) 
(reporting that Black students’ “friendships are no more diverse in college than in 
high school” even though the colleges in question have “substantially smaller” Black 
student populations).  The authors acknowledge that “while the rather small number 
of reported friends . . . may reflect . . . a student’s closest friends, it by no means 
provides a comprehensive measure of the degree of social interaction among students 
within or across racial groups.”  Id. at 1059.  This is an important limitation, as the 
educational benefits of diversity do not necessitate formation of close friendships, but 
rather cross-racial interactions for the purpose of breaking down racial stereotypes and 
learning about people of different racial and cultural backgrounds.  See Grutter, 539 
U.S. at 330; Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  My own observations also indicate that the closest 
friendships, even in diverse settings such as Du Bois College House, are usually 
(though not always) between students of the same race—but this does not negate the 
cross-racial interaction and understanding that also occurs.  Also, the authors’ implicit 
expectation that Black students would have more cross-racial friendships in college 
because of the “substantially smaller” Black student populations at colleges is short-
sighted.  Empirical data indicate that smaller Black student populations at colleges 
relate to greater feelings of racial isolation among Black students.  See Kidder, supra 
note 102, at 13 (“[D]ata from leading research universities show that higher levels of 
racial diversity are generally better for the campus climate faced by African American 
students, whereas racial isolation in combination with an affirmative action ban is 
associated with a more inhospitable racial climate.”).  One might thus infer the 
opposite: that Black students would actually be more likely to stick together and draw 
upon each other for support when their numbers are small and they feel racially 
isolated.  See also Boddie, supra note 112, at 801 (arguing that if there are few African 
American students on a campus, “[t]heir small numbers . . . make[] cross-racial 
interactions awkward and uncomfortable and, therefore, infrequent[] . . . lead[ing] to 
even greater social distance between whites and blacks on campus . . . [.]”).   
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Cross-racial interactions and conversations involving race occur much 
more frequently in race-conscious campus spaces than they do in the 
typical classroom, or in any predominantly White setting.  Indeed, such 
interactions and conversations are the very mission of many race-
conscious spaces.  Perhaps more than any other space on campus, the 
specific educational benefits of diversity on campus—as espoused in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence—occur in environments such as the 
W.E.B. Du Bois College House.  Academic and social discourse has 
historically treated Black-themed residence halls and similar 
environments as promoting “self-segregation” among groups of 
minority students.307  Conversely, this Article argues that universities 
should actually look to these environments when documenting and 
defending the educational benefits of diversity that justify their race-
conscious admissions policies.308 
In addition to facilitating the educational benefits of diversity for 
students of all backgrounds, spaces such as the W.E.B. Du Bois College 
House also serve another aspect of the compelling interest in diversity: 
they inherently help minority students feel less “isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.”309  They are some of the few 
environments on campus where particular groups of minority students 
might actually be in a numerical majority, and they function as social 
support centers for minority students.  As noted by Professor Samuel 
Museus, “ethnic student organizations . . . provid[e] students with 
venues of cultural familiarity, vehicles for cultural expression and 
advocacy, and sources of cultural validation, function[ing] to facilitate 
racial/ethnic minority students’ adjustment to and membership in . . . 
predominantly White campus cultures.”310 
Universities already recognize these phenomena, which is why 
they created race-conscious campus spaces in the first place.311  
Nevertheless, studying these spaces more thoroughly and 
documenting their activities can also help with the defense of race-
 
 307  See supra note 297. 
 308  Some of these spaces, like the Greenfield Intercultural Center at Penn, also 
focus specifically on bringing together different groups of minority students such 
Black and Latino students.  See Welcome to the Albert M. Greenfield Intercultural Center!, 
UPENN, http://www.vpul.upenn.edu/gic/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2015). 
 309  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319. 
 310  Samuel D. Museus, The Role of Ethnic Student Organizations in Fostering African 
American and Asian American Students’ Cultural Adjustment and Membership at 
Predominantly White Institutions, 49 J. COLLEGE STUDENT DEV. 568, 580 (2008). 
 311  Student activism also played a large role in the creation of such spaces.  See 
Glasker, supra note 297 (describing Black student activism at University of 
Pennsylvania and its role in creation of various race-conscious campus spaces).  
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conscious admissions policies.312  By highlighting race-conscious spaces 
as venues for the educational benefits of diversity, along with their 
established role as support centers for minority students, universities 
can more thoroughly demonstrate the benefits of race-conscious 
dialogue itself—not just for minority students but for all students.  This 
would also augment the defense of race-conscious admissions policies, 
as it would very tangibly illustrate their educational benefits and signal 
the salience of race in universities’ educational missions—going 
beyond the “racial aesthetics” decried by Justice Thomas.313 
Both of the proposals in this Section—emphasis on diversity 
within racial groups and increased attention to race-conscious campus 
spaces—illustrate that the compelling interest in diversity can readily 
incorporate race-consciousness, manifested through tangible activities 
and intangible values at universities.  By incorporating race-conscious 
goals and campus programs as central components of their 
educational missions, universities will more readily be able to defend 
their race-conscious admissions policies as narrowly tailored means to 
attain the educational benefits of diversity. 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of its quest for race-neutral alternatives, Fisher does not 
spell doom for race-conscious admissions policies.  This Article argues 
that the Supreme Court’s broadly-defined compelling interest in 
diversity, its endorsement of nuanced consideration of race in 
admissions, and its deference to universities in defining their 
educational missions, all actually support universities’ continuing use 
of race-conscious admissions policies.  Through its articulation of 
educational benefits of diversity, such as lessening racial stereotypes, 
and its emphasis on individualized, nuanced consideration of race, 
Fisher gives universities room to show that “no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”314 
 
 
 
 312  There is a small but growing academic literature on race-conscious campus 
spaces.  See Museus, supra note 310, at 569 (citing studies on ethnic student 
organizations); see, e.g., Lori D. Patton, Brian K. Bridges & Lamont A. Flowers, Effects 
of Greek Affiliation on African American Students’ Engagement: Differences by College Racial 
Composition, 29 COLLEGE STUDENT AFFAIRS J. 113 (2011); Meera E. Deo, Two Sides of a 
Coin: Safe Space & Segregation in Race/Ethnic-Specific Law Student Organizations, 42 WASH. 
U. J.L & POL’Y 83 (2013). 
 313  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
See also supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 314  Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013). 
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Nevertheless, this Article also calls on universities to do more than 
they have done to defend their race-conscious policies and programs.  
UT did argue that its race-conscious admissions policy facilitates 
diversity within racial groups, but universities can do much more to 
show how such within-group diversity relates to their compelling 
interest in diversity, and how their pursuit of diversity within racial 
groups falls in line with Grutter and Fisher’s narrow tailoring principles.  
This Article gives tangible suggestions for how universities can 
illustrate the importance of diversity within racial groups. 
Additionally, this Article argues that universities should highlight 
not only diversity within classrooms and within predominantly White 
settings, but also in race-conscious campus spaces where White 
students may not be the majority or even the plurality.  Such spaces do 
not merely cater to minority students; they are often the most salient 
venues for the educational benefits of diversity more broadly.  Cross-
racial interactions and lessening of racial stereotypes occur readily 
when White students are exposed to race-conscious campus spaces and 
partake in dialogues on race framed from the perspectives of minority 
students.  These spaces also help minority students feel less isolated 
and tokenized on campus, and they give White students a taste (albeit 
a relatively mild one) of life as a minority student on campus.  
Universities should not only encourage all of these activities, but also 
study and document them. 
In a broader sense, this Article calls upon universities to embrace 
race-consciousness—not only in their admissions policies but also in 
their educational missions and campus activities that promote the 
benefits of diversity.  Future defense of race-conscious admissions will 
require universities to be assertive about the importance of race, not 
only in admissions, but in everyday education and campus life.  This 
endeavor may well meet resistance and generate political and legal 
controversy.315  Nevertheless, there always has been and always will be 
such controversy surrounding race-conscious programs and policies, 
and universities should be assertive in defending them.  By requiring 
stringent review of the need for race-conscious admissions in Fisher, the 
Supreme Court essentially requires universities to take such a position. 
 
 
 315  There could be two levels of opposition to such openness.  There are those who 
oppose race-conscious policies altogether.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (Part IV of majority opinion, authored by 
Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas, states “[t]he way 
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”).  Some, however, may support such policies, but believe that stealth in pursuing 
them is a constitutional value.  See sources cited supra note 205. 
HARPALANI (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:18 PM 
2015] BROADLY COMPELLING 831 
As such, universities should embrace not only diversity, but race-
consciousness—with all of its complexities.316  They should do so not 
only in admissions or in special programs, but also in their educational 
missions.  In his 1978 Bakke dissent, the late Justice Harry Blackmun 
stated that: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account 
of race.  There is no other way.”317  More recently in her Schuette dissent, 
Justice Sotomayor contended that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of 
race.”318  While Supreme Court jurisprudence as a whole is currently 
hostile to these views, universities can and should use the Court’s 
broadly defined diversity interest to embrace race-consciousness in 
their campus programs, and to show that race-conscious admissions 
policies are necessary to fulfill their educational missions. 
 
 
 316  Some of these complexities are beyond the scope of this Article: for example, 
the conundrums of reconciling race-consciousness with racial self-identification and 
multiracial identity.  See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective 
Race: Racial Commodification and the Promise of New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179 
(2013); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Undoing Race? Reconciling Multiracial Identity with Equal 
Protection, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2014).  See also Nancy Leong, Identity Entrepreneurs at 
2, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2574987 (describing student who identifies as Native 
American on application based on one distant Native American ancestor as an “identity 
entrepreneur—someone who leverages his or her identity as a means of deriving social 
or economic value.”); Charles M. Blow, The Delusions of Rachel Dolezal, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/opinion/charles-blow-the-
delusions-of-dolezal.html (noting how story of woman who was born White but later 
began identifying herself as Black “has sparked a national conversation about how race 
is constructed and enforced, to what extent it is cultural and experiential, and whether 
it is mutable and adoptable.”). 
 317  Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 318  Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration, and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1676 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
